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[Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic,
260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977)].
I. INTRODUCTION: THE Sherlock DECISION
The view that a married couple may suffer an injury upon becoming
parents is of recent origin. During the past several years, cases have
arisen in which parents of unplanned children' have sued physicians
who performed an unsuccessful sterilization on one of the spouses.2 Re-
jecting the ancient adage that the birth of a child is always a blessing,3
courts have imposed liability on the negligent doctor for all the damages
resulting from the doctor's lack of care, including damages for the costs
of rearing the unplanned child.' Acknowledging current attitudes to-
1. The term "unplanned child" will be used throughout this Comment to describe the
infant born to parents who have attempted to prevent its conception. As the court com-
mented in Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503, 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970): "This child
is not to be thought of as unwanted or unloved, but as unplanned."
2. See, e.g., Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460, 463 (S.D.W. Va. 1967) (applying West
Virginia law) (recognizing claim based on negligent sterilization of mother); Depenbrok
v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., 79 Cal. App. 3d 167, 169 n.1, 144 Cal. Rptr. 724,
725 n.1 (1978) (recognizing claim based on negligent tubal ligation); Jackson v. Anderson,
230 So. 2d 503, 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (recognizing claim based on negligent
sterilization of mother); Bushman v. Burns Clinic Medical Center, P.C., 83 Mich. App.
453, 459-60, 268 N.W.2d 683, 685-86 (1978) (recognizing claim based on negligent vasec-
tomy); Cox v. Stretton, 77 Misc. 2d 155, 160-61, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834, 841-42 (Sup. Ct. 1974)
(recognizing claim based on negligent vasectomy); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41,
46, 356 N.E.2d 496, 499 (1976) (per curiam) (recognizing claim based on negligent tubal
ligation); cf. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 254, 187 N.W.2d 511, 517 (recognizing
claim based on negligent filling of prescription for birth control pills), leave to appeal
denied, 385 Mich. 753 (1971).
The current trend of cases can be dated from 1967 when the decision in Custodio v.
Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967), recognized an action by a woman
on whom a tubal ligation had been unsuccessfully performed. See id. at 311-16, 59 Cal.
Rptr. at 468-71 (finding complaint stated claims for negligence, breach of contract, and
misrepresentation). Although a few earlier cases appeared to recognize a claim based on
unsuccessful sterilization, see, e.g., West v. Underwood, 132 N.J.L. 325, 40 A.2d 610 (1945)
(negligent failure to perform sterilization necessitated second operation that led to compli-
cations but not pregnancy); Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964) (affirm-
ing verdict for physician who performed vasectomy on man whose wife subsequently gave
birth to healthy child on grounds that jury could have concluded that parents suffered no
damages and that recanalization was proximate cause of fertility), none has had the
impact of the Custodio opinion. See Kashi, The Case of the Unwanted Blessing: Wrongful
Life, 31 U. MLMI L. REv.. 1409, 1411-12 (1977).
3. See Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 131 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (Cadena, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974); cf. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169,
175 (Minn. 1977) (Biblical admonition to "be fruitful and multiply" no longer pertinent
for many Americans).
4. See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 324-25, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 476-77
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ward family planning and contraception, the Minnesota Supreme Court
reluctantly5 joined the trend toward recognition of the parents' claim in
Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic' and coined a new legal phrase to describe
the action-wrongful conception.'
Sherlock is typical of situations in which the parents' claim for dam-
ages has been recognized.8 Mr. Sherlock had submitted to a sterilization
(1967); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 252, 187 N.W.2d 511, 520, leave to appeal
denied, 385 Mich. 753 (1971); Cox v. Stretton, 77 Misc. 2d 155, 160-61, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834,
841-42 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 45-46, 356 N.E.2d 496, 498
(1976) (per curiam).
5. The opinion in Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977) contains
many indications of the court's dissatisfaction with this cause of action. Justice Rogo-
sheske, who authored the opinion, admitted he shared the view that "the birth of a healthy
child should always be regarded as a 'gift' of incalculable benefit to his parents." Id. at
177 n.15. However, instead of adopting the position of Chief Justice Sheran and Justice
Peterson that to award damages for the costs of rearing a child is contrary to public policy,
see id. at 177 (Sheran, C.J., dissenting), the majority of the court believed it would be
"myopic" to hold as a matter of law that the benefits incidental to parenthood outweigh
the rearing costs. Id. at 175; see notes 54-56 infra and accompanying text. As will later be
explained, the court's adoption of the incidental benefits rule, which Justice Rogosheske
expected would dissuade parents "from regarding that item of damages as the primary
and most significant basis for instituting suit," 260 N.W.2d at 177 n.15, may represent a
compromise between the two positions, an implicit recognition of the continuing vitality
of the dissent's position. See notes 186-224 infra and accompanying text.
Other expressions of concern are embodied in the court's admonition to the parents and
their attorneys, see notes 235-37 infra and accompanying text, and in the court's sugges-
tion to physicians that the adoption of the action may "support the position of those
doctors who refuse to perform nontherapeutic sterilizations 'on demand' on the ground
that such sterilizations 'frequently constitute a serious abuse of surgical license.' "Id. at
175-76 (quoting 2 D. LouisELL & H. WiLULms, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 19.11 (1977)).
As interesting as these observations may be, they must be understood in the light of
the holding in the case. The Justices did not permit their personal attitudes to interfere
with their recognition of an action for wrongful conception.
6. 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977). Approximately a year earlier, the court had been
presented with a case in which the underlying action was a claim for wrongful conception.
The parents in Martineau v. Nelson, 311 Minn. 92, 247 N.W.2d 409 (1976) had initi-
ated an action in Hennepin County District Court, alleging that their physician's negli-
gence in performing a tubal ligation and in giving incompetent advice following discovery
of the failure of the operation had resulted in the birth of an unplanned child. Id. at 93-
101, 247 N.W.2d at 411-14. The issue on appeal related solely to the sufficiency of the evi-
dence to support a jury verdict apportioning 50% contributory negligence to the parents.
Id. at 101, 247 N.W.2d at 415. Finding no support for apportioning any negligence to the
husband and inadequate evidence for apportioning 50% solely to the wife, the court re-
versed and remanded for a new trial. Id. at 104-06, 247 N.W.2d at 416-17. Because the
Martineau court did not pass directly on the propriety of the parents' claim and refrained
from disposing of the damages issue, see id. at 103, n.15, 106 n.18, 247 N.W.2d at 416 n.15,
417 n.18, the Sherlock decision was necessary to clarify these crucial points.
7. See 260 N.W.2d at 174-75. The court's reasons for adopting this term are explained
in notes 80-95 infra and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., cases cited in note 4 supra.
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to limit the size of his family,' he and his wife having decided that seven
children were enough. The physician performed a vasectomy and shortly
thereafter informed Mr. Sherlock that the operation had been a success.
The Sherlocks resumed sexual relations and discovered that the doctor
was wrong: fifteen months after performance of the vasectomy, Mrs.
Sherlock gave birth to a normal, healthy child.
The Sherlocks sued the physician for malpractice, claiming damages
for medical expenses, loss of consortium, and the costs of rearing their
unplanned, eighth child. A jury awarded $19,000 to the parents and the
physician appealed. In the supreme court, the physician lost on the
liability issue, but the parents obtained only a hollow victory. Although
the court recognized the action for wrongful conception, 0 it ruled that
damages should be measured by subtracting the value of the intrinsic
benefits of parenthood from the expenses of rearing the unplanned
child."
This Comment will explore the action for wrongful conception, com-
paring the decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court in the Sherlock
case with the decisions of other courts that have addressed similar
claims. First, the background and rationale behind the action will be
examined." An analysis of the nature of the action will follow in which
the reasons for adoption of the term "wrongful conception,"'" the possi-
ble legal bases for a claim,' and the limitations period applicable to the
action 5 will be discussed. Finally, the measure of damages will be ex-
plained, 6 with emphasis upon the application of the incidental benefits
rule in the action for wrongful conception.
II. THE BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE BEHIND THE Sherlock DECISION
The right of parents to control the size of their families underlies the
action for wrongful conception. 7 Absent recognition of this right, the
9. 260 N.W.2d at 171. This -type of sterilization is referred to as nontherapeutic. See
note 27 infra and accompanying text. When, as, for example, in Martineau v. Nelson, 311
Minn. 92, 247 N.W.2d 409 (1976), the sterilization is performed to protect the wife's
health, it is called therapeutic. See id. at 94, 247 N.W.2d at 411 (sterilization recom-
mended because of extreme tension and nervousness during fourth pregnancy).
10. See 260 N.W.2d at 170, 174-75.
11. See id. at 170-71, 175-76.
12. See notes 17-79 infra and accompanying text.
13. See notes 80-95 infra and accompanying text.
14. See notes 96-146 infra and accompanying text.
15. See notes 147-66 infra and accompanying text.
16. See notes 167-224 infra and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 317, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 472 (1967)
(public policy not opposed to sterilization that has as a purpose limiting family size);
Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 252-53, 187 N.W.2d 511, 516-17 (family planning
statutes evidence policy in favor of limiting family size), leave to appeal denied, 385 Mich.
753 (1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 175 (Minn. 1977) ("right to limit
procreation is of a constitutional dimension").
[Vol. 5
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action for wrongful conception may never have developed. Despite the
constitutional dimension the right has attained,'" the action for wrongful
conception did not originate from the ramifications of constitutional
decisions. 9 Rather, the action finds its roots in a 1934 decision of the
Minnesota Supreme Court applying common law principles.
In its opinion in Christensen v. Thornby,2 the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that the performance of a vasectomy upon a man whose
wife's health was endangered by childbirth did not violate any policy
opposed to birth control.2 1 The Christensen court noted that even in
states in which statutes had been enacted outlawing sterilization, the
operation was not forbidden if medically necessary.2 The husband's
18. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1977); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). See
generally L. TamE, AMERicAN CONsTrruTiONAL LAW § 15-10 (1978). In Skinner v. Oklahoma
ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), the Court stated:
Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of
the race. The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and
devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types which
are inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear. There is no redemp-
tion for the individual whom the law touches. Any experiment which the State
conducts is to his irreparable injury. He is forever deprived of a basic liberty.
We mention these matters not to reexamine the scope of the police power of the
States. We advert to them merely in emphasis of our view that strict scrutiny
of the classification which a State makes in a sterilization law is essential.
Id. at 541.
19. The United States Supreme Court's decisions on birth control may have given an
impetus to the action. See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 317-18, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 463, 472-73 (1967) (finding no contravention of public policy; recognizing but not
basing decision on constitutional right as enunciated in Griswold); Troppi v. Scarf, 31
Mich. App. 240, 252-54, 187 N.W.2d 511, 516-17 (public policy not opposed to use of
contraceptives; constitutional right cited as basis for alternative holding), leave to appeal
denied, 385 Mich. 753 (1971). The Supreme Court decisions, however, have not been the
focus of the opinions recognizing the action for wrongful conception. See id. at 252-53, 187
N.W.2d at 516-17 (state policy of providing contraceptives as part of welfare program and
use by millions of Americans demonstrated policy); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260
N.W.2d 169, 175 (Minn. 1977) (change in public policy reason for recognizing action). But
see Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 162, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950, 953-54 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (funda-
mental right to prevent procreation was basis of action), aff'd mem., __ A.D.2d -,
414 N.Y.S.2d 949 (1979); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 46, 356 N.E.2d 496, 499
(1976) (per curiam) (Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), Griswold, and Roe were founda-
tion for action).
20. 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934).
21. See id. at 125-26, 255 N.W. at 621-22.
22. See id. at 125, 255 N.W. at 621. The court referred to the Minnesota statute requir-
ing the consent of the insane or the mentally retarded to sterilizations performed on them.
See id. This statute, originally adopted in 1925, see Act of Apr. 8, 1925, ch. 154, 1925 Minn.
Laws 140 (repealed in part 1975), with some modifications is still in effect today. See
MINN. STAT. § 256.08 (1978) (sterilization of insane); id. § 256.09 (physician performing
operation not to be held civilly or criminally liable); id. § 256.10 (recordkeeping required).
The section of the original statute, relating to the sterilization of the mentally retarded,
1979]
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vasectomy in Christensen would have fit this narrow exception."3 Com-
mon law principles, the court continued, did not prohibit vasectomies
because the operation did not "render the patient impotent or 'unable
to fight for the king' as was the case in mayhem or maiming."24 Conse-
quently, the court was not barred from considering the husband's claim
for damages merely because he had consented to be sterilized."'
The Christensen court did limit its decision to the facts,26 an indica-
tion that the holding may have been otherwise if the sterilization had
been nontherapeutic, performed solely to limit the size of the plaintiff's
family." Roughly twenty years later, in Shaheen v. Knight, 2 1 a Pennsyl-
vania court expanded the Christensen holding and concluded that a
nontherapeutic sterilization was not contrary to public policy.' The
Shaheen court explained:
It is only when a given policy is so obviously for or against the public
health, safety, morals or welfare that there is a virtual unanimity of
opinion in regard to it, that a court may constitute itself the voice of
the community in declaring such policy void ....
It is the faith of some that sterilization is morally wrong whether to
keep wife from having children or for any other reason. Many people
have no moral compunctions against sterilization. Others are against
sterilization, except when a man's life is in danger, when a person is
low mentally, when a person is an habitual criminal. There is no virtual
unanimity of opinion regarding sterilization.0
In neither Shaheen nor Christensen did the courts rely upon constitu-
tional principles as a basis for their decision. Common law doctrines,
both courts concluded, were not in opposition to voluntary steriliza-
tion. " The parents' decision to control the number of offspring they
see Act of Apr. 8, 1925, ch. 154, § 1, 1925 Minn. Laws 140 (repealed 1975), was repealed
pursuant to a general modification of the law pertaining to the mentally retarded. See Act
of June 2, 1975, ch. 208, 1975 Minn. Laws 612. The consent of the mentally retarded to
sterilization, however, is retained under the new law. See MINN. STAT. § 252A.13 (1978).
The Minnesota statutory scheme, therefore, has never authorized involuntary sterilization
nor expressly prohibited voluntary sterilization.
23. See 192 Minn. at 125, 255 N.W. at 621.
24. Id. at 125, 255 N.W. at 622.
25. See id. at 125-26, 255 N.W. at 622.
26. See id. ("We therefore hold that under the circumstances of this case the contract
to perform sterilization was not void as against public policy.").
27. See Comment, A Constitutional Evaluation of Statutory and Administrative Im-
pediments to Voluntary Sterilization, 14 J. FAm. L. 67, 67 n.2 (1975); 9 UTAH L. REv. 808,
809 n.2 (1965).
28. 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (1957), noted in 19 U. Prrr. L. REv. 802 (1958).
29. See 11 Pa. D. & C.2d at 43-44.
30. Id. at 43.
31. See Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. at 125-26, 255 N.W. at 621-22; Shaheen v.
Knight, 41 Pa. D. & C.2d at 43-44. In accord with Christensen and Shaheen are Jessin v.
County of Shasta, 274 Cal. App. 2d 737, 748, 79 Cal. Rptr. 359, 366 (1969) (applicability
468 [Vol. 5
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would produce, therefore, could be regarded as a common law right.2
Although both the Christensen and Shaheen courts found no common
law objection to an action for damages caused by a negligent steriliza-
tion, neither court granted the plaintiffs any relief. 3 The results in both
cases were based on public policy that prevented the parents from as-
serting as an injury the birth of an unplanned child. In the final para-
graph of its opinion, the Christensen court stated:
The purpose of the operation was to save the wife from the hazards
to her life which were incident to childbirth. It was not the alleged
purpose to save the expense incident to pregnancy and delivery. The
wife has survived. Instead of losing his wife, the plaintiff has been
blessed with the fatherhood of another child. The expenses alleged are
incident to the bearing of a child, and their avoidance is remote from
the avowed purpose of the operation. As well might the plaintiff charge
defendant with the cost of nurture and education of the child during
its minority.Y
Implicit in this statement are the propositions that the birth of any
child, even an unplanned child, confers a blessing upon the parents and
that the common law would not admit that an injury could be sustained
as a consequence of the normal incidents of pregnancy and delivery.
The Shaheen court seized upon this language in Christensen and
elevated it to a legal principle. Although finding no "unanimity of opin-
ion" regarding the propriety of sterilization, 5 the Shaheen court de-
clared that "to allow damages for the normal birth of a normal child is
foreign to the universal public sentiment of the people."36 In effect, the
court ruled that the parents could suffer no injury as a matter of law.3 7
The decisions in Shaheen and Christensen illustrate the influence
public policy has had upon the formulation of the action for wrongful
of Griswold to sterilizations need not be considered because public policy does not prevent
such operations) and Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503, 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970)
(contract to perform sterilization not contrary to public policy).
32. Cf. Jessin v. County of Shasta, 274 Cal. App. 2d 737, 79 Cal. Rptr. 359 (1969) (court
noted Griswold but affirmed finding by trial court that voluntary nontherapeutic steriliza-
tions were legal in California in absence of countervailing public policy); Custodio v.
Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 317, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 472 (1967); Jackson v. Anderson, 230
So. 2d 503, 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
For nonjudicial attitudes on sterilization, see Wolf, Legal and Psychiatric Aspects of
Voluntary Sterilization, 3 J. FAM. L. 103, 104-18 (1963); Note, Elective Sterilization, 113
U. PA. L. REv. 415, 422-25 (1965) (doctors' and religious groups' attitudes).
33. See Christensen v. Thomby, 192 Minn. at 126, 255 N.W. at 622; Shaheen v. Knight,
11 Pa. D. & C.2d at 45-46.
34. 192 Minn. at 126, 255 N.W. at 622.
35. See 11 Pa. D. & C.2d at 43.
36. Id. at 45.
37. See id. at 45-46. In accord with Shaheen is Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 128
(Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974).
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conception. Both courts declined to rule that sterilization contravened
public policy, yet neither court was prepared to accept the view that the
birth of a normal child causes injury to its parents. The approach sug-
gested in Christensen and followed in Shaheen still finds adherents
todaym Unlike the reasoning in the Christensen and Shaheen opinions,
which was founded upon unsubstantiated interpretations of public pol-
icy, the current rationale advanced in support of the argument that the
birth of a normal child is not an injury seeks a legal basis in cases
involving the wrongful deaths of minors. 31 This rationale is illustrated
by a Texas court's decision in TerreU v. Garcia."5 The Terrell court
reasoned that to permit recovery of the costs of rearing an unplanned
child in an action for wrongful conception would be inconsistent with
the decisions in wrongful death cases in which "Texas courts virtually
hold as a matter of law that the probable earnings of a normal child
during his minority will more than offset the parents' expense of rearing
him." The wrongful death decisions, the Terrell court indicated, sup-
38. See, e.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8, 12-14 (Del. 1975); Terrell v. Garcia, 496
S.W.2d 124, 128 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974); Rieck v. Medical
Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 516-17, 219 N.W.2d 242, 244-45 (1974) (case involved
negligence in failing to diagnose pregnancy, not sterilization); cf. Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash.
2d 247, 250, 391 P.2d 201, 204 (1964) (jury verdict for physician reasonable as jury could
have found parents suffered no damage).
39. See, e.g., Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 177 (Minn. 1977) (Sheran,
C.J., dissenting); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974).
Rejection of the parents' claim for damages for the costs of rearing the unplanned child
has also been based on the theory that conjectural or speculative damages may not be
awarded. See generally Note, Wrongful Birth Damages: Mandate and Mishandling by
Judicial Fiat, 11 VAL. L. REv. 127 (1978). In Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975),
the court followed this reasoning and commented:
A child is born-how can it be said within the ambit of legal predictability that
the monetary cost of that life is worth more than its value? We recognize that a
few courts, approaching the problem in clinical terms, have applied a
"balancing test" which, presumably, permits a jury to say that a life has been
weighed and found wanting and thus the parents have been "damaged."
[citations omitted] We respect the efforts of other courts to provide a remedy
under the circumstances but it seems to us that that kind of judgment, if
appropriate at all in an American court of law, might be applied at the end of a
life, after it has been lived and when the facts can be identified. But, in our view,
any attempt to apply it at birth can only be an exercise in prophecy, an under-
taking not within the specialty of our fact-finders.
Id. at 12 (footnote omitted).
The response to the Coleman court's argument, ironically enough, lies in the evaluations
made in wrongful death cases. See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 262, 187
N.W.2d 511, 521 (measure of damages for loss of child's services and companionship in
wrongful death cases refutes argument that damages for birth of unplanned child are
impossible to determine), leave to appeal denied, 385 Mich. 753 (1971); Sherlock v. Still-
water Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Minn. 1977) (same).
40. 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974).
41. See 496 S.W.2d at 127.
[Vol. 5
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port a public policy that values life above the costs of living."2 Because
the parents' claim in an action for wrongful conception conflicts with
this policy, the Terrell court rejected the claim .
3
These objections to the parents' claim did not deter the Minnesota
court from recognition of the action for wrongful conception. Before
advancing its arguments in favor of the action, however, the Minnesota
court in Sherlock noted that opposition to the action was based on
arguments against finding that the birth of an unplanned child resulted
in an injury to the parents." Christensen, the Sherlock court stated, had
settled the question of whether a claim could be based on negligence in
performing a sterilization. 5 Although Christensen had been the basis for
several decisions finding an award of damages to be contrary to public
policy," the Sherlock court read Christensen narrowly. Characterizing
the final paragraph in Christensen as dicta, the Sherlock court consid-
ered the earlier opinion as support for the parents' claim. "Viewed in
its correct posture," the court explained, "the Christensen case stands
solely for the proposition that a cause of action exists for an improperly
performed sterilization." 7 This interpretation of Christensen had im-
plicitly been adopted only a year before Sherlock was decided. In
Martineau v. Nelson,8 parents of an unplanned child sued the physician
who performed a tubal ligation on the mother. On appeal, the only issue
presented related to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding
that the parents had been fifty-percent causally negligent by failing to
prevent conception in light of the doctors' suggestion that the operation
had failed.'" The court reversed, without indicating that the complaint
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be grantedO and without
discussing the issue of damages. 5' Thus, when Sherlock reached the
supreme court, the issue of whether the parents could obtain damages
for an unplanned child was undecided.
The Sherlock court addressed two arguments against awarding dam-
ages to parents of unplanned children, rejecting both. First, the court
distinguished "wrongful life" claims from the parents' wrongful concep-
tion claim on the ground that the parents were seeking compensation
42. See id. at 128.
43. See id.
44. See 260 N.W.2d at 173.
45. See id. at 172.
46. See id. at 173.
47. Id. at 172.
48. 311 Minn. 92, 247 N.W.2d 409 (1976).
49. See id. at 101, 247 N.W.2d at 415.
50. See id. at 104-06, 247 N.W.2d at 416-17. The Sherlock court explained that
"[ajlthough [Martineau] was concerned solely with evidentiary considerations, we
would not have resolved these questions had we disapproved of the underlying cause of
action for medical malpractice." 260 N.W.2d at 172 n.4.
51. See 311 Minn. at 103 n.15, 106 n.18, 247 N.W.2d at 416 n.15, 417 n.18.
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not for wrongful life but for the costs of rearing an unexpected infant.2
Thus, the rationale in wrongful life cases-that damages were too specu-
lative to permit recovery"-was inapposite. The second argument raised
the question of public policy. The court, noting that California 54 and
Michigan5 appellate courts had acknowledged that changes in public
attitudes toward birth control and family planning have undermined
the arguments advanced in Shaheen and Christensen, found the policy
objections to awarding damages for wrongful conception were no longer
viable. The court explained:
Although public sentiment may recognize that to the vast majority of
parents the long-term and enduring benefits of parenthood outweigh
the economic costs of rearing a healthy child, it would seem myopic to
declare today that those benefits exceed the costs as a matter of law.
The use of various birth control methods by millions of Americans
demonstrates an acceptance of the family-planning concept as an inte-
gral aspect of the modem marital relationship, so that today it must
be acknowledged that the time-honored command to "be fruitful and
multiply" has not only lost contemporary significance to a growing
number of potential parents but is contrary to public policies embodied
in the statutes encouraging family planning. Recent decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, moreover, seem to suggest that the right
to limit procreation is of a constitutional dimension."'
No longer, the Sherlock court intimated, did a "unanimity of opinion"
preclude awarding damages to parents of unplanned children.
In addition to the change in public attitude toward birth control, the
Minnesota court pointed to several other considerations in support of
the action for wrongful conception. Permitting parents to recover the
costs of rearing the child would have a deterrent effect upon negligent
performance of sterilizations.Y1 Furthermore, the court was reluctant to
free physicians from civil liability without "a legislatively granted im-
munity or declared public policy governing sterilization." 51 More cu-
riously, the court viewed the action as a reinforcement of the position
of physicians who are morally opposed to sterilization."
The latter two considerations, however, are negligible. Whether legis-
52. See 260 N.W.2d at 172 n.3. In accord with Sherlock is Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio
St. 2d 41, 45, 356 N.E.2d 496, 499 (1976) (per curiam).
53. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 28-29, 227 A.2d 689, 692-93 (1967).
54. See Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 317, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 472 (1967), cited
with approval in Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d at 173.
55. See Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 252-53, 187 N.W.2d 511, 516-17, leave to
appeal denied, 385 Mich. 753 (1971), cited with approval in Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic,
260 N.W.2d at 174.
56. 260 N.W.2d at 175 (footnotes omitted).
57. See id. at 175.
58. Id. at 176.
59. See id. at 175-76.
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lation declaring a public policy against sterilization is constitutional
after Griswold v. Connecticut"0 and Roe v. Wade" seems doubtful. As
an alternative method of birth control, sterilization should be entitled
to the same protection from government interference that exists for oral
contraceptives and abortion.2 Legislation immunizing physicians from
civil liability for the consequences of their negligence in performing
sterilizations appears to be as constitutionally objectionable as is legis-
lation prohibiting the procedure altogether. 3 Legislation that draws a
distinction between the types of medical malpractice for which a remedy
would be provided also may be unconstitutional as a denial of equal
protection." The Sherlock court's suggestion that legislation could be
drafted to immunize physicians from liability in the wrongful concep-
tion context therefore can be discounted because such legislation proba-
bly would be unconstitutional.
Reinforcement of moral objections to sterilization, as a reason for
recognition of the action for wrongful conception, is objectionable. A
physician may always refuse to perform the operation. 5 Recognition of
the action does not affect this right. Furthermore, it seems anamolous
to recognize a legal claim on the theory that objections to it will thereby
be strengthened."
60. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (finding unconstitutional a Connecticut statute forbidding
dissemination of contraceptive information and devices).
61. 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (finding unconstitutional a Texas statute making abortion
a criminal offense).
62. See Voe v. Califano, 434 F. Supp. 1058, 1061 (D. Conn. 1977) (assuming that sterili-
zation is entitled to same protection as other forms of birth control); note 19 supra.
63. Cf. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 689-91 (1977) (state may not
restrict sale of contraceptives by forbidding any person who is not a licensed pharmacist
from selling them).
In Doe v. Temple, 409 F. Supp. 899 (E.D. Va. 1976), the court was presented with issues
relating to the constitutionality of a Virginia statute that, while not immunizing physi-
cians from liability for performing sterilizations, did limit liability to acts of negligence
in certain circumstances. See VA. CODE §§ 32-423 to -426 (Cum. Supp. 1978). The court
ruled that the statute's preferential treatment for sterilizations of persons who have ob-
tained spousal consent raised a sufficient constitutional issue for the convening of a three-
judge panel. See 409 F. Supp. at 903.
64. See Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 46, 356 N.E.2d 496, 499 (1976) (per curiam)
(court declined to rule that action for wrongful conception gave rise to no damages because
to do so would possibly be violation of equal protection); cf. Doe v. Temple, 409 F. Supp.
899, 903 (E.D. Va. 1976) (Virginia law that granted preference to physicians who per-
formed sterilizations upon patients whose spouses consented to the operation raised con-
stitutional issue that justified convening of three-judge panel to consider question).
65. See J. KING, THE LAw OF MEDICAL MALPRaaCC IN A NurrsHzLL 20-21 (1977).
66. One commentator has characterized the Sherlock opinion as:
tak[ing] the odd position that it is socially desirable to hold the physician liable
and thereby discourage physicians generally from performing contraceptive ster-
ilizations, although the opinion recognizes that sterilization is becoming the
preferred method of birth control for married persons. The court neglects to
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The fallacies in some of the court's reasons for adopting the action for
wrongful conception indicate that the court failed to give full considera-
tion to the impact the constitutional right to limit or control procreation
has had upon the action. Despite the common law basis behind the
action, the impact of the Griswold and Roe decisions cannot be dis-
counted, as the Sherlock court appeared to do. These decisions of the
United States Supreme Court do not merely "seem to suggest" that the
right to control procreation has a constitutional dimension. 7 Griswold,
Roe, and their progeny have established that the right to control pro-
creation is a fundamental aspect of an individual's right of privacy."
State interference with this right will be subject to strict scrutiny by the
Court"9 and will be struck down absent a compelling state interest.50 The
explain why the law should adopt a rule which tends to limit a popular, safe
and effective method of birth control in our overpopulated age.
Clark, Wrongful Conception: A New Kind of Medical Malpractice?, 12 FAM. L.Q. 259, 272
n.62 (1979).
The Sherlock court's suggestion that wrongful conception would reinforce the opinion
of those surgeons who are morally opposed to sterilization is derived from 2 D. LouisE.LL
& H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 19.11 (1977), in which the authors, under the
caption heading "Excesses of Modern Medicine: Sterilizations," describe the operation as
frequently constituting "a serious abuse of surgical license." Id. The authors may be
correct in their suggestion that the operation should not be performed absent advice and
counsel to prepare the patient for the possible psychological effects of the sterilization.
See id. However, they appear to disregard the present attitude of the public towards
sterilization and lack the insight that the Sherlock court possessed concerning the opera-
tion. Furthermore, the authors fail to consider the impact of the Constitution on the
availability of sterilization. Their attitude toward sterilization, reflected in the caption
heading to the section in which they discuss the topic, is hardly persuasive.
A more realistic approach is taken in J. KING, supra note 65, in which the author
predicts that courts will move in the direction of the Troppi court. See id. at 222. See also
1 J. HoRTY, HosPrrAL LAw Patient Issues, ch. 2, at 16 (1978) (noting that "defendants have
been fortunate in not being burdened with what would likely be a sizable award of dam-
ages"). These authors suggest that the threat of a large award of damages, more than
moral objections, is a major reason for physicians to refrain from performing sterilizations.
In a study of Philadelphia physicians conducted circa 1964, loss of reputation and fear of
liability were cited as the two factors most inhibiting doctors from undertaking steriliza-
tion operations. See Note, supra note 32, at 422-27. Perhaps the observations made in D.
LouisL. & H. WiLIAms, supra, can be discounted as a minority view, to be respected but
certainly not to form a foundation for the action for wrongful conception.
67. See 260 N.W.2d at 175; note 56 supra and accompanying text.
68. See cases cited note 18 supra. But cf. Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975) (per
curiam) (state may prohibit performance of abortion by nonphysician without running
afoul of constitutional guarantees).
69. E.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977); Skinner v. Okla-
homa ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
70. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 689-91 (1977) (finding
statute that forbade sale of contraceptives by any person who is not a licensed pharmacist
unconstitutionally restrictive); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (finding statute
making abortion a criminal offense unconstitutional); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 485 (1965) (finding statute barring access to contraceptives unconstitutional).
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action for wrongful conception has the obvious effect of protecting this
fundamental right and may even be a constitutionally mandated rem-
edy for parents whose efforts to exercise their right have been thwarted
due to the negligence of another.7' It is questionable, therefore, whether
a court's refusal to grant the parents relief, just as a legislature's deter-
mination to prohibit parents from exercising their right, would be con-
stitutional."
By affording parents a common law remedy, the Minnesota Supreme
Court in Sherlock avoided these constitutional issues, and left open the
possibility of legislative intrusion into the action. Furthermore, by bas-
ing its decision to recognize the action upon an acknowledged change
in public attitude toward family planning and not upon the constitu-
tional right of privacy, the Sherlock court has "cast upon the sea of
public opinion what the Supreme Court has declared to be a matter of
strictly private concern."73
One argument against awarding damages to parents of unplanned
children that the majority opinion did not address was the position
indicated in Terrell-that wrongful death cases evince a policy determi-
nation that the value of human life exceeds the costs of living. Chief
Justice Sheran, dissenting in Sherlock, raised this objection to the ma-
jority decision.7' The Chief Justice based his dissent on a Minnesota
wrongful death case that stated: "[lit is difficult to visualize a case
where a human being does not have some monetary value in addition
to [pecuniary] damages incurred by the next of kin."7 5 In the case
quoted by the Chief Justice, however, the Minnesota court did not hold
as a matter of law that a loss would be inferred in every wrongful death
case.7 The court specifically left this issue to be dealt with by the
Legislature." In fact, comparing the costs of rearing a normal child to
majority with the child's probable earnings during minority prompted
the Minnesota court to state in one wrongful death opinion:
71. See Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 253-54, 187 N.W.2d 511, 517 (because state
may not infringe upon right of married persons to limit size of their families, "it may not
constitutionally denigrate the right by completely denying protection provided as a matter
of course to like rights"), leave to appeal denied, 385 Mich. 753 (1971); Rivera v. State,
94 Misc. 2d 157, 162, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950, 954 (Ct. Cl. 1978) ("Where a fundamental right
has been violated, the law must provide a remedy."), aff'd mem., - A.D.2d -, 414
N.Y.S.2d 949 (1979).
72. Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14-18 (1948) (state judicial action, even if
procedurally fair, may nevertheless constitute a violation of fourteenth amendment guar-
antees).
73. Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 162, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950, 954 (Ct. Cl. 1978), aff'd
mem., - A.D.2d -, 414 N.Y.S.2d 949 (1979).
74. 260 N.W.2d at 177 (Sheran, C.J., dissenting).
75. Id. (quoting Pehrson v. Kistner, 301 Minn. 299, 303, 222 N.W.2d 334, 337 (1974)).
76. See Pehrson v. Kistner, 301 Minn. 299, 303, 222 N.W.2d 334, 337 (1974).
77. See id. ("Perhaps the more realistic approach is by legislation.").
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When the cost to the parent of raising and educating the child is consid-
ered [in mitigation of damagesj, it is apparent that the strict adher-
ence to the pecuniary-loss test would in many instances prevent any
recovery whatever. Probable cost of raising him to maturity and edu-
cating him would be far greater than the provable value of his services."M
Furthermore, the policy reflected in wrongful death cases is not applica-
ble to wrongful conception actions because, as has been noted before,7
the parents are claiming damages for the expenses of raising an un-
planned child and not for the value of life over non-life. The objection
based on policies inherent in wrongful life cases may be sound in actions
for wrongful life, but is inapposite in actions for wrongful conception.
The failure of the majority to address the issue raised by the Chief
Justice's dissent therefore does not impugn the validity of the Sherlock
decision.
The result reached in Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, whatever the
faults in the underlying rationale, cannot be criticized. By deterring
physicians from failing to observe ordinary standards of care when they
assist persons who desire to exercise their right to control procreation,
the action for wrongful conception serves a necessary purpose in an age
when overpopulation is a vital concern.
I. THE NATURE OF THE ACTION
Acknowledging that public policy no longer prohibits parents from
asserting a claim based on the birth of an unplanned child only begins
to establish the contours of the action for wrongful conception. The
scope of the action endorsed by the Sherlock court contains limitations
derived not only from the language in the opinion itself but also from
particular aspects of Minnesota law. The full development of the action
for wrongful conception requires an analysis of these limitations.
A. Adoption of the Term "Wrongful Conception"
By calling the parents' claim for damages an action for "wrongful
conception," 0 the Minnesota court has attempted to achieve a more
precise definition of the claim than it believed was presented by the
more popular term "wrongful birth."'" The reasons given by the court
78. Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 353, 113 N.W.2d 355, 359 (1961), noted in 47
MINN. L. REv. 323 (1962).
79. See notes 39-43 supra and accompanying text.
80. 260 N.W.2d at 174-75.
81. Id. at 174-75. See generally LaPoint v. Shirley, 409 F. Supp. 118, 119 (W.D. Tex.
1976) (claim based on unsuccessful tubal ligation referred to as "wrongful birth" case);
Robertson, Civil Liability Arising from "Wrongful Birth" Following an Unsuccessful Steri-
lization Operation, 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 131, 132-33 (1978) (defining and distinguishing
wrongful birth and wrongful life claims).
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for rejecting the term "wrongful birth" also suggest limitations on the
action for wrongful conception.
First, the Sherlock court explained that the phrase "wrongful birth"
was unacceptable because it has been confused with the discredited
action for wrongful life."2 In an action for wrongful life, an infant seeks
damages for having been born in a disadvantageous condition2' 3 The
injury that the infant claims has been caused by the wrongful act of the
defendant is not that the infant is suffering from a disability-either
82. 260 N.W.2d at 172 n.3. Similarly, the New York Court of Claims has noted that:
the use of the term "wrongful life" in the decisions of other courts and in the
media, mostly by those who oppose causes of action such as this one. . . is an
unfortunate epithet, primarily because it is inaccurate as a description either
of the wrong which has been committed or of the injury suffered.
Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 161, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950, 953 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (claim based
on unsuccessful tubal ligation), aff'd mem., - A.D.2d -, 414 N.Y.S.2d 949 (1979).
No better example of the confusion can be offered than a Michigan appellate court's
decision in Bushman v. Burns Clinic Medical Center, P.C., 83 Mich. App. 453, 268
N.W.2d 683 (1978). In Bushman, the parents instituted an action for "wrongful preg-
nancy" and claimed damages only for the costs, including mental anguish, caused by the
unplanned pregnancy. Id. at 456-57, 268 N.W.2d at 684. Specifically, no damages were
sought for the costs of rearing the unplanned child. Id. at 458, 268 N.W.2d at 685. On this
basis, the Bushman court distinguished the earlier decision by another Michigan appellate
court in Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511, leave to appeal denied, 385
Mich. 753 (1971), characterizing Troppi as an action for wrongful life. See 83 Mich. App.
at 457-58, 268 N.W.2d at 685 (also noting disagreement with Troppi to the extent the
Bushman decision was inconsistent). The court continued, outlining cases showing judi-
cial disapproval of wrongful life claims, id. at 458-59, 268 N.W.2d at 685-86, and noting
the Sherlock court's adoption of the action for wrongful conception. Id. at 459 n.2, 268
N.W.2d at 686 n.2.
83. In the leading decision, Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849
(1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964), an illegitimate child brought suit against its
father for having caused its birth. The decision, which one commentator has called
"sensitive and insightful," Kashi, supra note 2, at 1419, rejected the child's claim. Al-
though courts would later reject similar cases because of the difficulty in proving damages,
see, e.g., Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546, 548 (Ala. 1978); Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App.
3d 698, 705-06, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652, 656-57 (1976), the Zepeda court was concerned more
with the consequences of recognition:
It is not the suits of illegitimates which give us concern, great in numbers as
these may be. What does disturb us is the nature of the new action and the
related suits which would be encouraged. Encouragement would extend to all
others born into the world under conditions they might regard as adverse. One
might seek damages for being born of a certain color, another because of race;
one for being born with a hereditary disease, another for inheriting unfortunate
family characteristics; one for being born into a large and destitute family,
another because a parent has an unsavory reputation.
41 111. App. 2d at 260, 190 N.E.2d at 858.
The action for wrongful life has prompted a number of commentators to speculate on
theories of recovery. See, e.g., Tedeschi, On Tort Liability for "Wrongful Life," 1 ISRAEL
L. REV. 513 (1966), reprinted in 7 J. FAM. L. 465 (1967); Note, A Cause of Action for
"Wrongful Life": [A Suggested Analysis], 55 MINN. L. REV. 58 (1970).
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legal"' or physicalS-but simply that the infant was born."6 The courts
have been confounded by these claims and unable to devise a measure
of damages for determining the value of life over non-life . 8 The action
for wrongful conception, brought by the parents to recover damages for
the costs of rearing the unplanned child," is therefore readily distin-
guishable from the action for wrongful life. By coining the phrase
"wrongful conception," the Minnesota court sought to avoid the legal
and philosophical problems associated with wrongful life claims.
To emphasize that the action for wrongful conception should not be
construed as an implicit recognition of the action for wrongful life, the
court stated: "[Tlhis cause of action is exclusively that of the parents,
since it is they and not the unplanned child who have sustained both
84. See Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 256-58, 190 N.E.2d 849, 856-57 (1963)
(illegitimacy), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964); Slawek v. Stroh, 62 Wis. 2d 295, 316-18,
215 N.W.2d 9, 21 (1974) (same). The Zepeda court recognized that legislation in Illinois,
"spring[ingJ from the conscience of man disturbed by the severity of the common law
and the patent injustices long suffered by innocent children, damned by the sins of their
parents," had lessened the plight of illegitimates. 41 Ill. App. 2d at 257, 190 N.E.2d at
857. Minnesota has also attempted to alter the legal distinctions between the legitimate
and the illegitimate. See Unborn Child v. Evans, 310 Minn. 197, 208-09, 245 N.W.2d 600,
607 (1976) (illegitimate child denied equal protection when its claim for proceeds of natu-
ral father's life insurance was rejected), noted in 4 WM. MrrCHELL L. Rzv. 233 (1978).
These attempts, however, have not made the social stigma of illegitimacy any less of a
hardship. See Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d at 258, 190 N.E.2d at 857.
85. See Becker v. Schwartz, 60 App. Div. 2d 587, 588, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119, 120 (1977)
(Titone, J., concurring) (deformed child sought damages "on the ground that she should
have been aborted"), modified, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978);
Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 83-84, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110, 114 (1977), modified, 46 N.Y.2d
401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978). See also Jorgensen v. Mead Johnson Labo-
ratories, Inc., 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973) (mongoloid twins born as result of mother's
use of birth control pills brought breach of warranty action); Burleson v. Mead Johnson
& Co., 463 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1972) (child born without arms or legs sued manufacturer of
mother's oral contraceptives); Frey, The Pill and the Code, 15 J. FAM. L. 1, 22-23 (1976).
86. See, e.g., LaPoint v. Shirley, 409 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Tex. 1976) (claim on behalf
of child for congenital deformity and parents' claim for other damages dismissed); Slawek
v. Stroh, 62 Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974) (child filed counterclaim seeking damages
for illegitimate birth in an action commenced by its natural father for judicial declaration
of paternity and visitation rights).
One commentator has formulated an approach to the damages issue by indicating that
the correct measure of damages is not the value of life over non-life, but life in a severely
defective state over non-life. In such situations, the value of non-life may indeed outweigh
the value of the defective existence. See Note, supra note 83, at 65-66.
87. See, e.g., Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546, 548 (Ala. 1978) ("Upon what legal
foundation is the court to determine that it is better not to have been born than to be
born with deformities?"); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 28, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967)
("The infant plaintiff would have us measure the difference between his life with defects
against the utter void of nonexistence, but it is impossible to make such a determina-
tion. . . .By asserting that he should not have been born, the infant plaintiff makes it
logically impossible for a court to measure his alleged damages.").
88. See Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d at 173, 175.
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physical and financial injury by the physician's negligence.""9 The first
limitation on the action for wrongful conception thus becomes clear: the
action may be brought only by parents. This limitation is consistent
with the view that the action serves to protect the parents' interest in
controlling procreation." Because this interest is one which the parents
do not share with the unplanned child or its siblings," only the parents
have the capacity to sue for negligent interference with their right to
control procreation.
A second limitation inherent in the adoption of the term "wrongful
conception" lies in the type of interference with the parents' interest in
controlling procreation that will be remedied by the action. According
to the Sherlock court, the term "wrongful birth" was imprecise because
the parents' injury does not occur when the child is born. Rather, "it is
at the point of conception that the injury claimed by the parents origi-
nates."" Under this analysis, wrongful conception refers only to those
cases involving sterilization or other preconception forms of birth con-
trol." If negligence occurs after the child is conceived, the phrase
"wrongful conception" would be inappropriate. Therefore, recognition
of the action for wrongful conception by the Minnesota Supreme Court
cannot be regarded as encompassing claims based on a physician's neg-
ligence in performing an abortion9" or in failing to disclose or discover
89. Id. at 175; see Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 45, 356 N.E.2d 496, 499 (1976)
(suit by parents for costs of raising a child not suit for "wrongful life" because not damages
for being versus non-being). See also Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 705-06, 127
Cal. Rptr. 652, 656-57 (1976) (claim brought by normal child against physician that
performed unsuccessful abortion on its mother dismissed although mother's claim recog-
nized).
90. Cf. Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692, 694-95 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (claim of parents based on hospital's negligence in testing for Tay-Sachs disease
separate and distinct from claim of child afflicted with the disease).
91. 260 N.W.2d at 175 n.7 (court merely observed that "it could be argued that the
siblings . . . are not entitled to sue for damages resulting from a diminution of either the
family wealth or their share of parental love and affection"); see Aronoff v. Snider, 292
So. 2d 418, 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (court affirmed dismissal of complaint of siblings
suing for the reduction of parental love and affection and wealth from one-third to one-
fourth each as a result of the unplanned birth); Cox v. Stretton, 77 Misc. 2d 155, 158-60,
352 N.Y.S.2d 834, 839-41 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (siblings' action dismissed on ground that sib-
lings suffered no personal injury). But see Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 323-
24, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 476 (1967) (change in family status caused by birth of unplanned
child that requires parents to spread "society, comfort, care, protection and support over
a larger group" should be compensable if capable of economic measurement).
92. 260 N.W.2d at 175.
93. See Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977) (negligent steriliza-
tion); Kashi, supra note 2, at 1410-19 (describing "wrongful conception" as claim involv-
ing negligent sterilization); cf. Whittington v. Eli Lilly & Co., 333 F. Supp. 98 (S.D.W.
Va. 1971) (claim against manufacturer of birth control pill). See generally cases cited note
2 supra.
94. A California appellate court recognized a claim by a woman against a physician who
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information that would have prompted the parents to terminate a preg-
nancy. 5 By choosing the term "wrongful conception" to describe the
parents' claim, the court has indicated acceptance of little more than
the issues presented to it in the Sherlock case: an action by parents of
unplanned children against a physician who performed a sterilization
upon one of the spouses in a negligent manner.
B. Basis of the Complaint
Various grounds for recovery have been advanced by parents in ac-
tions for wrongful conception. Although breach of contract or warranty6
performed an unsuccessful abortion in Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 701-03, 127
Cal. Rptr. 652, 653-55 (1976).
95. A number of courts have confronted the issue. See Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson
Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692, 695 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (failure properly to perform or interpret
genetic testing); Smith v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 654, 655 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (action
on behalf of child alleging failure to diagnose rubella in pregnant woman dismissed; cause
of birth defects not physician's fault); Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 58 Ill. App. 3d 349,
350-51, 374 N.E.2d 683, 685 (1978) (failure to warn of risks of birth defects when pregnant
woman given drug pitocin); Howard v. Lecher, 53 A.D.2d 420, 422, 386 N.Y.S.2d 460, 461
(1976) (failure to test for possibility of birth of child with hereditary disease), aff'd, 42
N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977); Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 A.D.2d 230,
230-31, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265, 267 (1974) (failure to diagnose pregnancy); Stewart v. Long
Island College Hosp., 35 A.D.2d 531, 532, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (1970) (failure to advise
pregnant woman who had rubella that she might be able to obtain abortion elsewhere).
The trend appears to be toward recognition. See Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ.
Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 652 (1976); Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 58 Ill. App. 3d 349, 374 N.E.2d 683 (1978);
Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 A.D.2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974). Although the Sherlock court
did refer in a footnote to the leading case in this area, the reference probably cannot be
viewed as approval of these claims. See 260 N.W.2d at 174 n.5 (citing Jacobs v. Theimer,
519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975)). The Jacobs case involved a claim by parents of a child born
with birth defects caused by the mother's having contracted rubella during pregnancy.
The physician had reassured the mother that she had not had rubella. See 519 S.W.2d at
847. In holding that the parents had a claim for damages, the Texas court rejected the
doctor's contention that had his advice been correct, the parents could not legally have
terminated the pregnancy because abortions had not been lawful at that time. See id. at
847-48. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Texas abortion statutes were declared
unconstitutional, the court observed, but the physician's liability in Jacobs was not based
on the physician's failure to advise the parents to terminate the pregnancy but on his
failure to inform the parents of the possibility of birth defects. See 519 S.W.2d at 848. The
ramifications of the Jacobs decision are explored in Kass & Shaw, The Risk of Birth
Defects: Jacobs v. Theimer and the Parents' Right to Know, 2 AM. J.L. & MED. 213 (1977).
The Minnesota court may recognize claims involving post-conception negligence in future
litigation without upsetting the Sherlock decision, but little guidance into such claims is
afforded in the opinion.
96. See, e.g., Bishop v. Bryne, 265 F. Supp. 460, 463-64 (S.D.W. Va. 1967) (absence of
proof that doctor gave express warranty led to dismissal of breach of warranty claim);
Depenbrok v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., 79 Cal. App. 3d 169, 170-71, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 724, 725-26 (1978) (promise of particular result may give rise to action for breach of
contract); Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 314-16, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463,470-71 (1967)
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and misrepresentation 7 have sometimes been alleged, the most common
basis for the action has been negligence. 8 To establish a claim in negli-
gence against a physician requires proof of the existence of a duty owed
by the physician to the injured party, a breach of that duty, a causal
connection between the breach and the injury, and damages.9
The physician's duty to a patient is easily established.'"° By agreeing
to perform an operation upon a particular person, the physician has
entered into a physician-patient relationship and owes that patient a
duty of reasonable care. 0' The scope of the physician's duty to the
(allegation that doctor agreed to sterilize patient sufficient to state claim for breach of
contract); Doerr v. Villate, 74 Ill. App. 2d 332, 337-38, 220 N.E.2d 767, 769-70 (1966)
(wife's action for damages based on birth of child following sterilization of husband is
proper breach of contract action); Green v. Sudakin, 81 Mich. App. 545, 548-49, 265
N.W.2d 411, 412-13 (1978) (failure of physician to advise patient that sterilization not
performed is breach of contract for which damages for mental suffering may be awarded);
Baldwin v. Sanders, 266 S.C. 394, 396, 223 S.E.2d 602-03 (1976) (wife's claim against
physician who unsuccessfully sterilized husband; action for breach of contract); Robert-
son, supra note 81, at 145-48; Comment, Liability for Failure of Birth Control Methods,
76 COLUM. L. REV. 1187, 1188-91 (1976) (discussing negligence, breach of warranty, and
misrepresentation as bases of claims for wrongful conception); Note, Remedy for the
Reluctant Parent: Physician's Liability for the Post-Sterilization Conception and Birth
of Unplanned Children, 27 U. FLA. L. REv. 158, 165-67 (1974).
97. See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 314, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 470 (1967)
(physician's opinion on effect of sterilization is actionable if patient relied on opinion);
Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 763 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974) (in absence of proof of
fraudulent intent, claim of misrepresentation would be dismissed), aff'd, 349 A.2d 8 (Del.
1975); Comment, supra note 96, at 1190-91. If the physician is a federal employee and the
claim is consequently brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680
(1976), misrepresentation would not be a proper basis for the claim. See Herring v. Knab,
458 F. Supp. 359, 362-63 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (claim that doctor failed to inform patient of
probabilities of pregnancy following even successful tubal ligation was claim based on
misrepresentation and barred under Federal Tort Claims Act's exclusion of misrepresen-
tation claims); Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976) (misrepresentation
and other intentional torts excepted from provisions of Act).
98. See, e.g., Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460, 463-64 (S.D.W. Va. 1967) (negligence
in performing sterilization on woman); Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 311-13,
59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 468-70 (1967) (failure to perform sterilization properly, failure to con-
duct proper post-operative tests, failure to obtain informed consent alleged); Cox v. Stret-
ton, 77 Misc. 2d 155, 155, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834, 836-37 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (negligence in diagno-
sis, surgical procedure, and treatment); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 44-45, 356
N.E.2d 496, 498 (1976) (per curiam) (patients' signatures on consent form do not relieve
physician from liability for negligence); Robertson, supra note 81, at 139-44 (identifying
four stages in sterilization when negligence may occur: preoperative, operative, postopera-
tive testing, and postoperative counseling); Comment, supra note 96, at 1187-88.
99. See J. KING, supra note 65, at 37; Robertson, supra note 81, at 138.
100. See Robertson, supra note 81, at 138.
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patient's spouse, however, rarely has been discussed by the courts in
wrongful conception cases. When both spouses have consulted with a
physician on sterilization, they both become that physician's patients.",2
As patients, the doctor owes both the same duty of care. When only one
spouse has consulted with the physician about sterilization, however,
the duty to the other spouse is less clear. The physician's duty to non-
patients has been established in cases involving communicable diseases,
seizures, and other situations in which an injury to a third person,
especially a family member, is reasonably foreseeable. 03 By analogy, an
injury to a non-patient spouse would be reasonably foreseeable in the
sterilization context.1'0 The analysis is weakened, however, when the
non-patient spouse has declined to consent to the sterilization. '05 In this
situation, the non-consenting spouse may not be permitted to assert
that the physician's negligence, resulting in an unplanned birth, has
caused any injury to his or her interests. 06 Thus, when one spouse has
102. In Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (SD.W. Va. 1967), the court noted that the
parents' complaint contained "no averment that [the husband] suffered any physical
injury by reason of the ineffectiveness of the operation on his wife; nor can any such
inference be drawn from the facts alleged." Id. at 465. The Bishop case involved no claim
by the husband for loss of the wife's consortium. The decision to retain the husband in
the suit was based solely upon his having paid the delivery expenses. See id. at 465-66.
Other courts have reached similar results. See Baldwin v. Sanders, 266 S.C. 394, 395-96,
223 S.E.2d 602, 602-03 (1976) (wife's claim for damages against doctor who performed
vasectomy on her husband recognized because wife had provided funds for operation); cf.
Doerr v. Villate, 74 Ill. App. 2d 332, 337-38, 220 N.E.2d 767, 770 (1966) (sterilization may
give rise to action for property damage for other spouse); Milde v. Leigh, 75 N.D. 418, 28
N.W.2d 530 (1947) (sterilized spouse has claim for personal injuries; other spouse, for loss
of consortium).
103. See J. KING, supra note 65, at 206-09; Hirsh, Physician's Legal Liability to Third
Parties Who are Not Patients, 1977 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 388, 389-92.
104. Contract claims in two cases were successfully brought by wives of men who had
been sterilized despite the contention of the doctors involved that the wives had not been
parties to the sterilization contract. See Doerr v. Villate, 74 Ill. App. 2d 332, 337-38, 220
N.E.2d 767, 769-70 (1966); Baldwin v. Sanders, 266 S.C. 394, 395-96, 223 S.E.2d 602,602-
03 (1976). While these cases may be distinguished on the ground that the wives had alleged
the existence of a contractual relationship between themselves and the physicians, the
decisions indicate that when the sterilization concerns a married person, the spouse's
interests are necessarily affected and may be the subject of separate claims.
105. According to the authors of a recent article, the consent of both spouses should be
required before a sterilization can be performed on either because of the permanent effect
the operation has on the couple's ability to procreate. See Sherlock & Sherlock, Voluntary
Contraceptive Sterilization: The Case for Regulation, 1976 UTAH L. REv. 115, 129-31. The
article, however, was written prior to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), which held that the spouse's consent
could not be required as a condition to obtaining an abortion. Id. at 69-72. The reasoning
of the article's authors appears to be seriously undercut by the Planned Parenthood
decision, especially because the article was based primarily upon the reasoning of the
lower court in the Planned Parenthood case.
106. If the operation fails and a child is born, it is difficult to see how the nonconsenting
[Vol. 5
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failed to consent to the other spouse's sterilization, only the sterilized
spouse should have standing to assert a wrongful conception claim.
Once the duty of care has been established, the patient must show
that the duty has been breached. 7 This requires proof of the standard
of care applied by the medical community in sterilization operations. 11
Failure to perform the operation, of course, constitutes a breach."119
When the operation has been performed, however, proof of a lack of care
becomes more difficult. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is probably
unavailable. The doctrine permits triers of fact to infer negligence when
an act results in an injury that ordinarily does not occur in the absence
of negligence." 0 In sterilization operations, however, an ascertainable
spouse, who opposed the sterilization, has suffered any injury. But see Note, supra note
32, at 437-38 (suggesting, albeit with little conviction, that nonconsenting spouse may
have action for alienation of affections). A more troublesome issue for physicians may be
the possibility of suit by the nonconsenting spouse for having performed the operation
without his or her consent. Such a suit, however, is probably unconstitutional. See Murray
v. Vandevander, 522 P.2d 302, 303 (Okla. 1974) (court rejected claim of husband against
doctor and hospital responsible for his wife's hysterectomy because only wife's consent to
operation was necessary); cf. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976)
(spouse's consent to abortion cannot constitutionally be required because state cannot
"delegate to a spouse a veto power which the state itself is absolutely and totally prohib-
ited from exercising .. " (quoting with approval, Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 392
F. Supp. 1362, 1375 (E.D. Mo. 1975))); Przybyla v. Przybyla, 87 Wisc. 2d 441, 445,
275 N.W.2d 112, 115 (1978) (ex-husband's suit for intentional infliction of mental dis-
tress against ex-wife who had undergone abortion dismissed for failure to state claim
because abortion did not constitute outrageous conduct under Wisconsin law's definition
of mental distress).
107. See J. KING, supra note 65, at 37; Robertson, supra note 81, at 138.
108. See Robertson, supra note 81, at 138. The standard of care to which a physician
who performs a sterilization must adhere was at issue in Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247,
391 P.2d 201 (1964). Finding a dispute in the evidence on the proper standard of care in
the community, the court noted that "[tihe absence of an accepted standard of practice
is due partially to the fact that the operation is usually performed in the physician's office
rather than a hospital." Id. at 248, 391 P.2d at 203. As a result of the absence of an
accepted standard of care, the jury in Ball was permitted to determine that the physician's
failure to conduct post-operative tests was not a departure from proper practice. See id.
at 249-50, 391 P.2d at 205. In the years following Ball, however, accepted practice devel-
oped to the point that the failure of the doctor in Sherlock to conduct such tests resulted
in the imposition of liability. See 260 N.W.2d at 171.
109. See West v. Underwood, 132 N.J.L. 325, 326, 40 A.2d 610, 611 (1945) (failure to
sterilize raised issue of negligence); cf. Green v. Sudakin, 81 Mich. App. 545, 546, 265
N.W.2d 411, 412 (1978) (per curiam) (failure to inform patient that tubal ligation was not
performed constituted breach of contract).
110. See Spannaus v. Otolaryngology Clinic, 308 Minn. 334, 337, 242 N.W.2d 594, 596
(1976) (severe neck pain following removal of vocal cord nodule); Hestbeck v. Hennepin
County, 297 Minn. 419, 425-26, 212 N.W.2d 361, 365-66 (1973) (sponge left in patient
during operation); Miller v. Raaen, 273 Minn. 109, 118-20, 139 N.W.2d 877, 883-84 (1966)
(describing doctrine in medical malpractice context); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS §§ 39-40 (4th ed. 1971).
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risk of failure exists."' One court has suggested that a short period of
time between the date of the sterilization and the pregnancy may give
rise to an inference of negligence."' Most courts, however, have recog-
nized that the failure rate, which exists even when the operation has
been properly performed, precludes application of the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine."' Thus, more is required of the plaintiff in a wrongful concep-
tion case than the bare showing of a sterilization and a subsequent
pregnancy.
Proving that the physician was negligent in performing the operation
is sometimes difficult, absent an admission of negligence by the doc-
tor." ' This difficulty is due to the fact that, as the Sherlock court re-
marked, "the area operated upon is fully concealed." 1 5 Furthermore, in
111. See, e.g., Herring v. Knab, 458 F. Supp. 359, 361-62 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (applying
Maryland law) (expert testimony revealing 1.8 failures per thousand tubal ligations pre-
cluded application of doctrine of res ipsa loquitur); Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757,
762 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974) (two percent failure rate shown), aff'd, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975).
112. See Vaughn v. Shelton, 514 S.W.2d 870, 874 (Tenn. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 514
S.W.2d 870 (Tenn. 1974). The Vaughn court stated:
When we consider the evidence in the case at bar and the short period of time
that elapsed after the operation when pregnancy was again found in the patient,
a reasonable conclusion from that fact might be that one or both of the tubes
were not closed, whether by negligence or a mere oversight and failure to carry
out the implied terms of the agreement that the tubes would be closed.
514 S.W.2d at 874.
113. See Herring v. Knab, 458 F. Supp. 359, 361-62 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (applying Mary-
land law) (mere fact that tubal ligation failed did not establish physician's negligence
when expert testified to known failure rate of 1.8 per thousand); Coleman v. Garrison, 327
A.2d 757, 762 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974) (doctrine inapplicable when injuries are possible in
absence of negligence in two percent of cases), aff'd, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975); Lane v.
Cohen, 201 So. 2d 804 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (mere fact that vasectomy failed did not
establish physician's fault). But see Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 126, 255 N.W.
620, 622 (1934) ("It is a matter of common knowledge that [a vasectomy] operation
properly done in due course effects sterilization."); Vaughn v. Shelton, 514 S.W.2d 870,
874 (Tenn. Ct. App.) (short period of time between operation and pregnancy may lead to
conclusion of negligence), cert. denied, 514 S.W.2d 870 (Tenn. 1974).
114. Evidence of negligence may be established by the statements of the physician who
rendered the injury-producing medical care. See Thorkeldson v. Nicholson, 145 Minn. 491,
492, 175 N.W. 1008, 1008 (1920) (per curiam) (physician's statement that he knew dece-
dent had been "treated wrong" admissible); MINN. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A) (admission by
party opponent). Such statements may be obtained at trial or during discovery. See
Anderson v. Florence, 288 Minn. 351, 358-62, 181 N.W.2d 873, 878-80 (1970) (testimony
of defendant-physician may be compelled at deposition).
115. 260 N.W.2d at 171 n.1; accord, Note, Sterilization and Family Planning: The
Physician's Civil Liability, 56 GEO. L.J. 976, 986 (1968). In Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp.
460 (S.D.W. Va. 1967), proof of alleged negligence in the performance of a woman's
sterilization was found during birth by Caesarean section when it was discovered that one
of her fallopian tubes was intact. See id. at 463. In Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d 512
(Tenn. 1974), the defendant's negligence was discovered during the delivery of a prema-
ture child. See id. at 512-13. In Garwood v. Locke, 552 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977),
evidence of the defendant's negligence was discovered while a tubal ligation during a
[Vol. 5
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the case of vasectomies, which can be performed in a doctor's office," e
only in a rare instance would witnesses to improper procedures be avail-
able. A lack of post-operative care is less difficult to prove. For example,
the failure of a physician to conduct post-operative tests following a
vasectomy may be evidence of negligence."' Proper medical care ap-
pears to require the doctor to conduct numerous sperm counts to deter-
mine when sterility has been achieved."" Even in a successful vasec-
tomy, residual sperm continues to be discharged after the operation.",
Absent other precautions, conception could result if sexual relations
were resumed during this period. 20 A claim could be based, therefore,
on the physician's failure to conduct these tests or failure to conduct
them properly.12' Furthermore, if a physician failed to inform the patient
of the possibility of conception during this period and failed to advise
the patient to use other birth control techniques, the physician could be
guilty of a violation of a duty to disclose pertinent information to the
patient. 22
The causal connection between the injury and the breach of duty
usually has not been disputed.1n An intervening or superseding cause,
however, could insulate the physician from liability. For example, in a
vasectomy, the vas deferens, the organ that is severed to effect male
sterility, may regenerate, reversing the operation. 2 A physician could
subsequent hysterectomy was performed. See id. at 894. Absent similar unusual circum-
stances, however, proof that the performance of the operation was negligent would be
difficult to establish.
116. See Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 249, 391 P.2d 201, 203 (1964) (noting that
absence of accepted standard for performance of vasectomy "is due partially to the fact
that the operation is usually performed in the physician's office rather than a hospital");
Note, supra note 32, at 416 (vasectomies often performed in physician's office).
117. This was the successful allegation of negligence inthe Sherlock case. See 260
N.W.2d at 171 & n.1.
118. See Robertson, supra note 81, at 142; Wolf, supra note 32, at 104; cf. Forbes,
Voluntary Sterilization of Women as a Right, 18 DEPAuL L. Rxv. 560, 561 (1969)
("[Cloitus should not be performed until no sperm can be seen in the ejaculate under
the miscroscope.").
119. See Lombard, Vasectomy, 10 SuFFoLK U.L. Rzv. 25, 33 (1975).
120. See Robertson, supra note 81, at 143.
121. See id. at 142-43.
122. See, e.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 762-63 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974) (duty
to warn of probable results depends upon circumstances of case and general practice in
community which must be established by expert testimony), aff'd, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975);
Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 445-46, 379 A.2d 1014, 1023 (1977) (failure to inform woman
of risk of pregnancy following tubal ligation may result in physician liability), rev 'g 34 Md.
App. 217, 367 A.2d 525 (1976). See generally Note, Wrongful Conception: Who Pays for
Bringing up Baby?, 47 FoawHAM L. REv. 418, 423-24 (1978).
123. Robertson, supra note 81, at 144.
124. See Note, supra note 32, at 417, 434. Regeneration, or recanalization as it is more
commonly called, is more likely to follow a vasectomy than a tubal ligation. See id. at
436. One commentator has suggested that negligence is more probable if pregnancy follows
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assert that the pregnancy resulted from this process, known as recanali-
zation, 25 rather than negligence. Obviously, a physician would be insu-
lated from liability if the pregnancy was caused not by the vasectomized
husband but by rape, artificial insemination, or adultery. 2 ' The parents'
conduct may also be an intervening cause when, for example, they re-
sume sexual relations in spite of the physician's advice to the contrary.'27
In the absence of such advice, however, a simple resumption of sexual
relations by the parents would not qualify as an intervening cause. As
one court explained:
The general test of whether an independent intervening act, which
actively operates to produce an injury, breaks the chain of causation is
the foreseeability of that act . . . . It is difficult to conceive how the
very act the consequences of which the operation was designed to fore-
stall, can be construed as unforeseeable.'28
a tubal ligation, see id., but other sources indicate that negligence may not be inferred in
such a case. As the court mentioned in Depenbrok v. Kaiser Foundation, 79 Cal. App. 3d
167, 144 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1978):
Admittedly, the "characteristic" result of a bilateral tubal ligation is sterility.
The problem that gives rise to this case is that, in a certain percentage of cases,
the result is not characteristic but non-characteristic. The medical evidence is
that, for a variety of reasons, some involving medical negligence and some not,
sterilization does not result.
Id. at 171, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 726. Recanalization is therefore not the sole reason for the
failure of a tubal ligation or a vasectomy. Other natural causes could lead to fertility
despite a sterilization.
125. See Herring v. Knab, 458 F. Supp. 359, 362 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (applying Maryland
law) (expert opinion given that recanalization, not negligence in performing tubal ligation,
was cause of pregnancy); Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d 512, 513-14 (Tenn. 1974) (doctor
tendered defense of regeneration; on appeal from motion for summary judgment, court
did not find this defense to l4e conclusive); Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 249-50, 391
P.2d 201, 204 (1964) (physician's defense based on recanalization supported jury verdict
in defendant's favor).
126. See Robertson, supra note 81, at 144-45 (prophesizing physician's defense that
sterilized husband was not father of child but questioning propriety of defense in light of
presumption of legitimacy). But cf. Note, supra note 32, at 434 & n.72 (anticipating that
courts will be reluctant to accept defense that sterilized husband is not father because
such a defense would also establish illegitimacy of the child).
127. See Martineau v. Nelson, 311 Minn. 92, 103, 247 N.W.2d 409, 416 (1976) ("plaintiff
wife might have acted unreasonably in failing to at least attempt to persuade her husband
to have a vasectomy or, in the absence of vasectomy, in failing to continue a regimen of
birth control" after being informed by physician that tubal ligation may not have been
successful).
128. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 316-17, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 472 (1967).
Other courts have reached similar results. See Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460, 463-64
(S.D.W. Va. 1967) (part played by husband of wife who had undergone unsuccessful
sterilization not intervening cause of pregnancy). See also Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St.
2d 41, 43, 356 N.E.2d 496, 498 (1976) (per curiam) (signature on consent form no bar to
action for liability based on negligence); Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d 512, 513 (Tenn.
1974) (defense raised but not addressed by court).
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As defenses, intervening and superseding cause therefore rarely would
be available. If a physician has been negligent in performing a steriliza-
tion, a foreseeable consequence of that negligence would be the birth of
an unplanned child. "'
Proving damages, such as the loss of consortium, medical expenses,
as well as the costs of rearing the unplanned child, completes the par-
ents' prima facie case. A more detailed analysis of the damage issue is
contained later in this Comment.'3 At this point, it is sufficient to note
that the parents must carry the burden of proving damages as an ele-
ment of their claim for negligence.'
Claims other than negligence raise special problems. A claim based
on a contract theory is subject to the rule that, in medical malpractice
cases, a physician does not warrant a cure merely by undertaking to
perform a particular treatment.'32 An express contract guaranteeing the
result of a sterilization operation must be established before a claim
based on breach of contract will be successful. 3 ' In Custodio v. Bauer, I"
for example, a California court held that an allegation that the physi-
cian had agreed to sterilize the patient was sufficient to state a claim
against the physician for breach of contract.131 The Custodio court did
not indicate whether its decision was based on mere semantics: it is
uncertain whether the same result would have been reached if the alle-
gation had stated that the physician had agreed to perform a steriliza-
tion operation and not to sterilize \the patient. Custodio merely ad-
dressed the sufficiency of a complaint to state a claim and not the
129. See Robertson, supra note 81, at 144.
130. See notes 167-224 infra and accompanying text.
131. See Robertson, supra note 81, at 138.
132. Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 762 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974), aff'd, 349 A.2d 8
(Del. 1975); see Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 314-16, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 470-
71 (1967).
133. See Herring v. Knab, 458 F. Supp. 359, 363 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (no claim for breach
of promise when statement constituted opinion or "therapeutic reassurance"); Bishop v.
Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460, 463 (S.D.W. Va. 1967) (breach of warranty to effect sterilization
not established in absence of proof of express guarantee of success); Clegg v. Chase, 89
Misc. 2d 510, 511, 391 N.Y.S.2d 966, 967 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (warranty action dismissed due
to failure to allege special contract).
134. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
135. The court wrote:
Reference to the allegations of the complaint permits the interpretation that
plaintiffs and defendants agreed in writing that the latter would sterilize Mrs.
Custodio by an operative procedure, and that she agreed to pay a reasonable
fee for that service. Performance by plaintiffs, other than the wife's submitting
to the operation, is not clearly alleged. Failure of performance by defendants
and resulting damages are set forth. There are sufficient allegations to withstand
the general demurrer, or, in any event, to warrant an opportunity to amend.
Id. at 315-16, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 471.
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sufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict. 30 Presumably, stronger
evidence of the physician's agreement would be necessary to sustain a
verdict in favor of the parents on a breach of contract theory.' 37
Misrepresentation, as the basis of an action for wrongful conception,
requires, at the least, proof that the physician made a false statement
of a material fact.'- Furthermore, the defendant must have made the
statement with knowledge that it was false. 39 A deceitful motive is not
necessary, "4 however, although the court in Christensen v. Thornby held
that the failure to allege a fraudulent purpose was the reason for dis-
missing the father's complaint in that case."' A misrepresentation claim
may be based on a false statement made by a person who is unaware
that the statement was false."' Thus, in Custodio v. Bauer, the allega-
tion that the doctor told the parents that a. sterilization would prevent
conception was a sufficient basis for a misrepresentation claim because
the doctor should have known that such a statement was not true in
every case. "4
Although the theories of misrepresentation and breach of contract
may have formed the basis for claims against physicians in other juris-
dictions, patients in Minnesota probably should base their claims solely
on a negligence theory. In a recent case, the Minnesota Supreme Court
stated that the liability of professional persons under Minnesota law
must be predicated on negligence."'4 The case concerned the liability of
136. See id.
137. See Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 453, 379 A.2d 1014, 1027 (1977) (holding that proof
of a preoperative warranty must be established by clear and convincing evidence).
138. See Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 250, 391 P.2d 201, 204 (1964) (plaintiffs failed
to prove doctor's advice to resume sexual relations after vasectomy was made recklessly
without knowing it to be true or false; no inference would arise that man's fertility one
year after operation meant that doctor gave him false advice following operation).
The basic elements of a misrepresentation claim are set forth in Custodio v. Bauer, 251
Cal. App. 2d 303, 313-14, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 470 (1967) (representation of material fact,
falsity, scienter, inducement, reliance, and damage).
139. See, e.g., Davis v. Re-Trac Mfg. Corp., 276 Minn. 116, 117, 149 N.W.2d 37, 39
(1967).
140. See, e.g., Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169, 176 (8th Cir.
1971) (applying Minnesota law); Lewis v. Citizens Agency of Madelia, Inc., 306 Minn. 194,
198, 235 N.W.2d 831, 834 (1975) (misrepresentation may be based upon mistake; intent
not a necessary element).
141. See 192 Minn. at 126, 255 N.W. at 622.
142. See, e.g., Davis v. Re-Trac Mfg. Corp., 276 Minn. 116, 117, 149 N.W.2d 37, 39
(1967).
143. See 251 Cal. App. 2d at 314 & nn.8 & 9, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 470 & nn.8 & 9.
144. See City of Mounds View v. Walijarvi, 263 N.W.2d 420, 423-25 (Minn. 1978)
(rejecting theory of implied warranty as basis for imposing liability upon professional
persons). But see Martineau v. Nelson, 311 Minn. 92, 99-100 & nn. 1 & 2, 247 N.W.2d
409, 414 & nn.1 & 2 (1976) (trial court permitted parents' wrongful conception claim to
go to jury on breach of warranty theory; evidence supported finding that physician gave
no warranty); Hedin v. Minneapolis Medical & Surgical Inst., 62 Minn. 146, 64 N.W. 158
[Vol, 5
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architects, but could easily be applied to physicians. Proof of negligence
will be required in a medical malpractice action if the court extends the
reasoning of this case to all professional persons. The effect of such a
requirement, however, probably would not affect the action for wrongful
conception. Claims based on error in a physician's advice or information
could be stated under the theory of lack of informed consent, a species
of negligence."'
The action for wrongful conception in Minnesota is therefore more
properly viewed as a tort action. In matters of proof, the action is indis-
(1895) (finding evidence sufficient to support verdict for patient based on institute's
misrepresentation that patient's condition was curable by treatment at institute).
Statutes in some states achieve the same result. See Shessel v. Gay, 139 Ga. App. 429,
429, 228 S.E.2d 361, 361 (1976) (dismissing contract claim because of statute that limited
physician's liability in sterilization cases to negligence); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-935.1 (1979)
(liability of physicians for sterilization must be based on negligence); VA. CODE § 32-426
(1973) (physicians' liability for sterilization limited to negligence provided statute fol-
lowed).
145. See Robertson, supra note 81, at 145 (claim based on lack of informed consent is a
tort-contract hybrid); cf. Vaughn v. Shelton, 514 S.W.2d 870, 871 (Tenn. Ct. App.) (dic-
tum) (claim for negligence in performing sterilization "might have been brought and
designated as one for breach of contract"), cert. denied, 514 S.W.2d 870 (Tenn. 1970).
More importantly, however, the distinction between tort and contract claims is less
crucial in Minnesota than in other jurisdictions. In other states, a contract claim would
be measured by a different statute of limitations than would a tort claim. See, e.g., Doerr
v. Villate, 74 Ill. App. 2d 332, 220 N.E.2d 767 (1966) (wife's action for breach of contract
for sterilization subject to five-year period of limitations; not a personal injury claim
subject to two-year period). Bringing a contract claim against a physician in those states
would subject the claim to a longer statute of limitations than a tort claim. See Bishop v.
Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460, 466 (S.D.W. Va. 1967) (claim for tort subject to two-year limita-
tions period; claim for breach of warranty, to five-year period); Robertson, supra note 81,
at 146. The Minnesota statute of limitations, on the other hand, contains a specific section
that applies to every claim, whether in tort or in contract, against physicians. See MINN.
STAT. § 541.07(1) (1978); notes 147-66 infra and accompanying text. Framing a complaint
against a physician in contract therefore would not affect the limitations period. Thus,
the primary advantage for stating a claim in contract against a physician is unavailable
in Minnesota.
One commentator has noted another disadvantage to bringing a contract claim against
a physician-the possibility that the doctor's malpractice insurance may not provide
coverage against claims based on breach of warranty. See Robertson, supra note 81, at
146.
An additional disadvantage lies in the differing measure of damages for breach of
contract and negligence. See Comment, Pregnancy After Sterilization: Causes of Action
for Parent and Child, 12 J. F m. L. 635, 641-42 (1973). The measure of damages for breach
of contract would encompass only foreseeable losses, but damages awarded for losses
sustained as a result of negligence would include all damages proximately caused. See
Christianson v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 67 Minn. 94, 96-97, 69 N.W. 640, 641 (1896).
The distinction, however, may not be so clear-cut. See Wild v. Rarig, 302 Minn. 419, 440-
41, 234 N.W.2d 775, 789-90 (1975) (per curiam) (claims that arise out of breach of duty
owed as a consequence of a particular relationship can constitute independent torts for
which tort measure of damages would be applicable despite presence of contractual rela-
tionship between parties), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 902 (1976).
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tinguishable from an ordinary medical malpractice action. As the
Sherlock court noted, however, "the perplexing and developing nature
of the law relating to damages in cases of this type" raises issues that
require a different analysis than would be necessary in the ordinary
medical malpractice case.' While in matters of proof, wrongful concep-
tion and medical malpractice may be comparable, wrongful conception
more properly should be regarded as a special form of malpractice. This
observation should not affect the basis for the wrongful conception
claim. Simply stated, the action for wrongful conception requires proof
that a physician agreed to perform a sterilization upon a particular
person, that despite the sterilization a child was conceived, and that the
failure of the sterilization can be traced to some fault of the physician.
Fault can be established by proof of negligence in performing the opera-
tion, in treating the patient following the operation, or in failing to
inform the patient of the risk of pregnancy following the operation.
C. Statute of Limitations
Commencement of an action for wrongful conception in Minnesota,
if based upon a physician's "malpractice, error, mistake or failure to
cure,"' 47 is subject to a two-year statute of limitations.' 8 This special
medical malpractice statute is applicable to any claim against a physi-
cian regardless of whether the claim sounds in tort or in contract. 4 ' As
interpreted by the Minnesota Supreme Court, the statute requires
commencement of an action within two years of the date on which the
patient received the treatment that caused the injury. 50 The period is
tolled when the exact date is difficult to determine, but then only until
146. 260 N.W.2d at 171.
147. MINN. STAT. § 541.07(l) (1978).
148. Id. § 541.07. The portion of the statute applicable to medical malpractice provides:
[Tihe following actions shall be commenced within two years:
(1) For ... all actions against physicians, surgeons, dentists, hospitals, sana-
toriums, for malpractice, error, mistake or failure to cure, whether based on
contract or tort ....
Id. All the statutes of limitations in Chapter 541 are governed by MINN. STAT. § 541.01
(1978), which states that "[aictions can only be commenced within the periods pre-
scribed in this chapter, after the cause of action accrues ...."
149. See id. § 541.07(1) (statute applies to actions "whether based on contract or tort").
150. See Murray v. Fox, 300 Minn. 373, 376-77, 220 N.W.2d 356, 358-59 (1974); Plotnik
v. Lewis, 195 Minn. 130, 133, 261 N.W. 867, 868 (1935) (although general rule suspends
statute until termination of relationship, where, as here, evidence conclusively establishes
that malpractice must have occurred on earlier date, statute begins to run on that earlier
date). But see Couillard v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., Inc., 253 Minn. 418, 428, 92 N.W.2d
96, 103 (1958) (statute "suspended" until terminaton of doctor-patient relationship). The
rule is not unique to Minnesota. See, e.g., Anderson v. Wagner, 61 Ill. App. 3d 822, 825-
26, 378 N.E.2d 805, 808 (1978) (statute in effect at time of injury required commencement
of action within four years of date of act causing injury).
[Vol. 5
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the last date of treatment by the physician. 15' Ignorance of the injury
does not toll the statute.'52 Only if the physician fraudulently conceals
the malpractice from the patient is the period tolled until the patient
discovers the injury.'
5 3
If this traditional interpretation of the statute is followed in actions
for wrongful conception, injustice may result when the unplanned child
is not conceived during the two-year period. Because the exact date of
the sterilization operation can be fixed with certainty, the statutory
period could run before the date of either conception or discovery of the
pregnancy.1'1 The problem inherent in the Minnesota statute is illus-
trated by the parents' dilemma in the California case of Custodio v.
Bauer. Trying, as the court observed, "to steer a course between the
Scylla of limitations and the Charybdis of prematurity,' "15 the parents
in Custodio commenced their suit prior to the birth of the child.', Par-
ents of unplanned children in Minnesota may have no alternative but
to follow the route of the Custodios if the Minnesota court adheres to
its strict interpretation of the Minnesota statute of limitations. This
could result in problems of alleging damages when the child has not
been born prior to commencement of the suit. Still graver problems
could result when the parents' suit is barred before the child has been
conceived.
To avoid this injustice, courts in other states, such as California,'
57
have adopted the discovery rule. 5 ' Under the discovery rule, the statute
151. See Johnson v. Winthrop Laboratories Div., 291 Minn. 145, 149, 190 N.W.2d 77,
80 (1971).
152. See id. at 151, 190 N.W.2d at 81; Schmucking v. Mayo, 183 Minn. 37, 39, 235 N.W.
633, 633 (1931) ("[Ilgnorance is the result of want of diligence, and the [patient] cannot
take advantage of his own fault.").
153. See Schmucking v. Mayo, 183 Minn. 37, 39, 235 N.W. 633, 633 (1931).
154. This injustice was recognized by the Texas Supreme Court in Hays v. Hall, 488
S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1972):
One who undergoes a vasectomy operation, and then after tests is told that he
is sterile, cannot know that he is still fertile, if that be the case, until either his
wife becomes pregnant or he is shown to be fertile by further testing. If the
limitation period is measured from the date of the operation, and if the discovery
of fertility, and therefore the injury, is not made until after the period of limita-
tion has run, the result is that legal remedy is unavailable to the injured party
before he can know that he is injured. A result so absurd and so unjust ought
not to be possible.
Id. at 414.
155. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 322, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
156. The parents filed their suit before the birth of the child apparently because they
believed that the suit must be commenced within two years of the sterilization. Had they
waited for the child to be born, the two-year period would have run. See id. at 309 n.4,
322, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 467 n.4, 476.
157. See id. at 309 n.4, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 467 n.4.
158. See, e.g., Hackworth v. Hart, 474 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Ky. 1971) (period runs from
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of limitations does not begin to run until the injury is discovered or
should have been discovered.' If the period is tolled pursuant to the
discovery rule, parents of unplanned children would have a sufficient
period of time in which to bring their action for wrongful conception.
The Minnesota court, however, has disapproved of the discovery rule in
ordinary medical malpractice actions,'"0 and may adhere to that inter-
pretation in wrongful conception cases.
The Sherlock opinion did not address the issue of limitations. The
child was born within fifteen months of the date of the father's vasec-
tomy and the lawsuit was timely filed.'' Nevertheless, the Sherlock
opinion does suggest an approach to the issue for parents whose child is
not so timely conceived. In the ordinary malpractice action, the pa-
tient's injury is sustained while in the physician's care.'62 Therefore, to
require the action to be commenced within two years after termination
of the treatment does not seem unreasonable. In the action for wrongful
conception, however, the parents' injury, according to the Sherlock
court, does not arise until the child has been conceived." 3 Thus, the
action for wrongful conception does not accrue until the moment of
discovery of fertility, usually when wife learns of pregnancy); Hays v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d
412, 414 (Tex. 1972) (following the Hackworth rule).
159. See Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460, 466 (S.D.W. Va. 1967); Anderson v. Wag-
ner, 61 111. App. 3d 822, 825-26, 378 N.E.2d 805, 808 (1978) (noting Illinois' discovery rule
cases, but not following them due to amended version of statute). But see Cox v. Stretton,
77 Misc. 2d 155, 158, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834, 839 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (action based on lack of
informed consent akin to assault and battery, thus not subject to discovery rule as would
be "foreign object" medical malpractice cases).
160. See Johnson v. Winthrop Laboratories Div., 291 Minn. 145, 148-51, 190 N.W.2d
77, 79-81 (1971); Schmucking v. Mayo, 183 Minn. 37, 39, 235 N.W. 633, 633 (1931) (discov-
ery rule expressly rejected unless doctor guilty of fraud).
161. The sterilization had been performed on December 11, 1970; the date of last treat-
ment apparently was January 23, 1971; the child was born on March 6, 1972. 260 N.W.2d
at 171. The action was commenced after the birth of the child. Appellants' Brief and
Appendix at 5.
162. See, e.g., Swang v. Hauser, 288 Minn. 306, 309, 180 N.W.2d 187, 189-90 (1970).
163. 260 N.W.2d at 175. In Hays v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1972), the court recog-
nized that:
If the limitation period is measured from the date of the operation, and if the
discovery of fertility, and therefore the injury, is not made until after the period
of limitation has run, the result is that legal remedy is unavailable to the injured
party before he can know that he is injured. A result so absurd and so unjust
ought not to be possible.
Id. at 414; accord, Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d 512, 515 (Tenn. 1974) (in wrongful
conception case filed three and one-half years after sterilization, court remarked that state
public policy was opposed to "requiring that suit be filed when circumstances totally
beyond the control of the injured party make it impossible for him to bring suit"). But
see Cox v. Stretton, 77 Misc. 2d 155, 158, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834, 839 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (although
statute does not toll until discovery under "foreign object" theory, negligent sterilization
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conception, when the statute of limitations should begin to run.
This interpretation of the statute of limitations would be consistent
with the result reached in the Sherlock case. Furthermore, the court
would not be required to reevaluate the present construction of the
statute of limitations if such an interpretation were adopted, since the
statute could be limited to the special circumstances of the action for
wrongful conception. Moreover, the statute does not prohibit such a
result. The statute merely states that actions against physicians "shall
be commenced within two years.""' The statute does not indicate when
that two years should begin to run. 65 If the court determines that the
date of the injury, rather than the date of the injury-producing treat-
ment, is the crucial date, parents of unplanned children would not be
deprived of a remedy.' Justice would be served by adopting this limjted
version of the discovery rule in the action for wrongful conception.
IV. DAMAGES
The Sherlock opinion is important not only because it recognized an
action for wrongful conception but also because the Minnesota court
considered the practical effect of its decision on the measure of damages.
In other jurisdictions, recognition of the action has occurred on appeals
from motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.'67 The issue of damages was not raised in these cases. In
164. MINN. STAT. § 541.07 (1978).
165. Although the period of limitations under Minnesota law does not commence until
"the cause of action accrues," see id. § 541.01, this does not require a court to date the
commencement of the period from the day on which the wrongful conduct occurred. See
J. KING, supra note 65, at 266-67. The period can commence to run upon discovery of the
injury. See id. at 267-68; notes 154-59 supra and accompanying text. Thus, the Minnesota
court's strict adherence to the former rule could be abandoned without being inconsistent
with the statutory language. Cf. Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d 512, 514-15 (Tenn. 1974)
(Tennessee "accrual" statute interpreted to be consistent with discovery rule).
166. See Kashi, supra note 2, at 1413 n.16. Professor King concludes that, in the law of
medical malpractice:
Ideally, what is needed is an unequivocal codification that preserves causes of
action long enough for plaintiff to have a fair opportunity to discover them, yet
recognizes an outside limit beyond which no actions, except perhaps for cases
involving knowing concealment, will survive. A finite cut-off is probably neces-
sary at some point in time regardless of the state of the patient's knowledge if
the policy considerations underlying the statutes of limitations are to be vindi-
cated.
J. KING, supra note 65, at 283.
167. Although a number of the reported decisions concerned appeals from motions to
dismiss granted in favor of the physician, see, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d
303, 307, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 465 (1967), a few have involved appeals after trial on the
merits. See, e.g., Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 43, 356 N.E.2d 496, 498 (1976) (per
curiam) (jury verdict awarding damages of $450,000 as well as $12,500 damages for hus-
band's loss of consortium and expenses upheld); Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 250,
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Sherlock, the appeal followed a trial on the merits of the parents' claim
and the court was confronted with arguments on the proper measure of
damages.'68 Attempting to balance the parents' interests with the tradi-
tional assertion that the birth of a child causes no injury, the court
arrived at what can only be described as a compromise solution. The
parents were permitted to recover the costs of rearing their unplanned
child, but the physicians were allowed to offset recovery by the intrinsic
benefits of parenthood.
A. Mitigation of Damages: Abortion and Adoption
Roughly a year prior to the Sherlock decision, the Minnesota Supreme
Court handed down its decision in the case of Martineau v. Nelson.'68
In Martineau, the plaintiffs sought damages based on the physician's
negligence in performing a tubal ligation.7 ° The physician argued in
defense that the parents were guilty of contributory negligence in failing
to have the unplanned fetus aborted or in failing to have the unplanned
child placed for adoption.'' The Martineau court rejected these argu-
ments, stating that "[t]he policy of the law would be thwarted if
[parents] were forced to make such moral and ethical choices . . .
under a cloud of contributory fault.""' Nevertheless, the court declined
to rule on the question of whether the parents' failure to abort or surren-
der the child should be considered in mitigation of damages.'"1 This
issue was tersely resolved by the Sherlock court: "It is also our view that
the refusal of a mother to submit to an abortion or of the parents to give
their child up for adoption should not be regarded as a failure on the
part of the parents to mitigate damages."' The Sherlock court offered
no explanation for its viewpoint. Nevertheless, its position is consistent
with the spirit of the law governing the parent-child relationship.
In other cases, the Minnesota court has remarked that the state's
adoption statutes constitute:
a judgment by the legislature that the best interest of a child will most
likely be served if parental consent is required in all cases except aban-
donment and loss of custody through divorce. The correlative rights
and duties inherent in the parent-child relationship are natural rights
391 P.2d 201, 202 (1964) (verdict for defendants; jury entitled to conclude that parents
suffered no injury as result of child's birth).
168. See 260 N.W.2d at 171-72, 174-76.
169. 311 Minn. 92, 247 N.W.2d 409 (1976).
170. See id. at 93-94, 247 N.W.2d at 411.
171. See id. at 103-04'n.15, 247 N.W.2d at 416 n.15.
172. Id.
173. See id.
174. 260 N.W.2d at 176; accord, Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 162-63, 404 N.Y.S.2d
950, 954 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (decision not to have abortion may not prevent recovery), aff'd
mem., - A.D.2d - , 414 N.Y.S.2d 949 (1979).
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of such fundamental importance that it is generally held that parents
should not be deprived of them "except for grave and weighty rea-
sons."'
This policy would have been thwarted if the court had determined that
parental rights must be surrendered in mitigation of damages in an
action for wrongful conception.' Because duress is the basic ground for
invalidating parental consent to adoption,' it is doubtful that consent
to an adoption as a precondition to recovery in a wrongful conception
case would be effective. Nor would adoption truly mitigate damages: in
effect, adoption would absolve the physician of all liability for the costs
of rearing the child. Because the Minnesota Supreme Court and the
Minnesota Legislature have adhered to the position that the best inter-
ests of a child are served by its being raised by its natural parents,178 a
contrary decision would have been untenable.
Similarly, requiring the parents to terminate a pregnancy as a condi-
tion to recovery of damages also would have absolved the physician of
175. In re Parks, 267 Minn. 468, 474, 127 N.W.2d 548, 553 (1964) (citing In re Adoption
of Pratt, 219 Minn. 414, 427, 18 N.W.2d 147, 154 (1945)). In Parks, the court reversed a
lower court order granting adoption in favor of the natural father's second wife when the
natural mother refused to consent to the termination of her parental rights. See id. at 469,
127 N.W.2d at 550.
176. See Note, supra note 32, at 436 (noting that upon birth, parents may feel responsi-
ble for raising child and that requiring adoption would encourage separation of parents
and children). The suggestion was made in Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (1957)
that the parents' claim for damages should not be recognized because "[mlany people
would be willing to support this child were they given the right of custody and adoption."
Id. at 46. This view has been criticized as "not consistent with the very stability of the
family which the same court relies on to support its views of 'universal public sentiment.'"
Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 324, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 477 (1967).
177. See, e.g., In re Welfare of J.M.S., 268 N.W.2d 424, 428 (Minn. 1978) (consent to
court order terminating parental rights may not be withdrawn absent fraud, duress, or
undue influence); In re Alsdurf, 270 Minn. 236, 239, 133 N.W.2d 479, 481 (1965) (consent
to placement of child with adoption agency invalid because of duress).
178. Perhaps this statement is best illustrated by the line of cases in Minnesota dealing
with termination of parental rights. In re Welfare of E.G., 268 N.W.2d 420 (Minn. 1978),
concerned the request of foster parents of a 10-year-old child, who had lived with them
since it had been 45 days old, to intervene in an action by the natural mother for custody
of the child. The court stated:
The natural home, as noted in the statute [Mr'mN. STAT. § 260.011(2) (1978)],
is the preferred place for any child. Even when the child has been adjudged
neglected and removed from his home, his ultimate return to his natural family
should continue to be the goal sought. The test to be applied in any individual
case, however, is what is in the best interests of the child.
Id. at 421. The court rejected the foster parents' request. See id. at 422. In re Welfare of
E. G., however, dealt with the rights of foster parents as against the natural parents. As
against adoptive parents, natural parents have fewer rights. Cf. In re Welfare of J.M.S.,
268 N.W.2d 424, 428 (Minn. 1978) (natural parents may not upset adoption unless consent
obtained by fraud, undue influence, or duress).
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all liability for the costs of rearing the child. More fundamentally, how-
ever, requiring the parents to terminate the pregnancy would have been
unconstitutional under decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
In Roe v. Wade'79 the Court held that any attempt by the states to
interfere with a woman's right to an abortion during the first trimester
of pregnancy unconstitutionally infringed upon her right of privacy.10
Requiring abortion in the wrongful conception context would be as
much an interference with this right as a flat prohibition against abor-
tion. '8 Therefore, the Sherlock court's determination that the mother's
failure to have an abortion should not be considered in mitigation of
damages probably is constitutionally necessary.
Common law principles also support the court's decision. The com-
mon law rule originally did not require a person "to risk his life upon
the operating table" to mitigate damages. 8 2 The original rule has been
modified, however. The present rule requires a person to submit to
minor surgery, when reasonable, to reduce damages.' An abortion,
which is as safe during the first trimester of pregnancy as is completing
the full term of pregnancy,'84 could be such minor surgery under this
rule. The controversy over abortion, however, suggests that, even if an
abortion is considered medically to be minor surgery, it would not be
an operation that a reasonable person would find a necessary precondi-
tion to the award of damages in a civil suit.8 5
The Sherlock court's determination not to require abortion or adop-
179. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
180. See id. at 152-54, 163-64.
181. See Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 163, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950, 954 (Ct. Cl. 1978)
(requiring abortion "would constitute an invasion of privacy of the grossest and most
pernicious kind"), aff'd mer., - A.D.2d - , 414 N.Y.S.2d 949 (1979).
182. Gibbs v. Almstrom, 145 Minn. 35, 37, 176 N.W. 173, 174 (1920); accord, Butler v.
Whitman, 193 Minn. 150, 152, 258 N.W. 165, 166 (1934). But see Couture v. Novotny, 297
Minn. 305, 312-13, 211 N.W.2d 172, 176 (1973) (reasonably prudent person standard
applied; if operation not unreasonable, injured party's failure to undergo it and mitigate
damages may be considered in reducing damages).
183. See Couture v. Novotny, 297 Minn. 305, 309-13, 211 N.W.2d 172, 174-76 (1973)
(reviewing Minnesota case law).
184. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 149 (1973).
185. See Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 260, 187 N.W.2d 511, 520 (tortfeasor
cannot complain that damages incurred by woman whose "emotional and mental
makeup" is opposed to abortion are greater than those incurred by woman willing to
abort), leave to appeal denied, 385 Mich. 753 (1971); Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 A.D.2d 230,
233, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265, 269 (Sup. Ct. 1974) ("The right to have an abortion may not be
automatically converted to an obligation to have one."); Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157,
163, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950, 954 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (requiring abortion "would constitute an inva-
sion of privacy of the grossest and most pernicious kind"), aff'd mer., - A.D.2d -,
414 N.Y.S.2d 949 (1979). See generally Depenbrok v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.,
79 Cal. App. 3d 167, 144 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1978) (due to medical necessity, woman termi-
nated pregnancy after unsuccessful tubal ligation).
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tion in mitigation of damages for wrongful conception is therefore con-
sistent with well-established state policies and constitutional principles.
As will later be made clear, however, this aspect of the decision appears
to be inconsistent with the measure of damages adopted by the Sherlock
court.
B. The Incidental Benefits Rule
The final award of damages for wrongful conception, while not re-
duced by the parents' failure to terminate the pregnancy or to surrender
the child for adoption, will be affected by the Sherlock court's applica-
tion of the incidental benefits rule to the measure of recovery. As set
forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the incidental benefits rule
provides:
Where the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the
plaintiff or to his property and in so doing has conferred a special
benefit to the interest of the plaintiff that was harmed, the value of the
benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages, to the extent
that this is equitable.'
The purpose of the rule, according to the Restatement, is "primarily to
restrict the injured person's recovery to the harm that he actually in-
curred and not to permit the tortfeasor to force a benefit on him against
his will."' 7 Traditionally, the rule has been applied in cases in which a
physician has performed unrequested surgery.18 For the patient to re-
186. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 920 (1977).
187. Id., Comment f. The contours of the incidental benefits rule are suggested by the
reference to a Minnesota case, Morris v. St. Paul City Ry., 105 Minn. 276, 117 N.W. 500
(1908), in the note following section 920 as it appeared in Tentative Draft No. 19.
RFESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Tors § 920, Note (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973). In Morris, the
plaintiff, a pregnant woman, was struck by a streetcar and suffered a miscarriage. The
streetcar company contended that her damages should be measured by deducting from
the pain and suffering caused by the miscarriage the value of the pain and suffering she
was saved by not having to go through childbirth. See 105 Minn. at 279, 117 N.W. at 501-
02. In essence, the streetcar company was arguing that, by losing her child prematurely,
the plaintiff had obtained a benefit by physically suffering less pain from the miscarriage
than she would have by childbirth. The court rejected the contention on the ground that
the pain and suffering she would have sustained from a normal childbirth was "too
remote, speculative, and uncertain to be taken as a basis for estimating damages. Her
possible future suffering has no connection whatever with the suffering which resulted
from the negligent act of the [streetcar company]." Id. at 281, 117 N.W. at 502. Morris
indicates that for a defendant to have the opportunity of arguing the balance between
benefit and loss, the benefit must first be a real benefit, capable of being accurately
measured.
188. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920, Comment a, Illustrations 1-2 (1977).
According to the comments following this section in Tentative Draft No. 19, the first two
illustrations of the incidental benefits rule were derived in part from a Minnesota case,
Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905), overruled on other grounds, Genzel
v. Halvorson, 248 Minn. 527, 534, 80 N.W.2d 854, 859 (1957). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
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cover for the technical tort of battery without considering the benefit to
one's health caused by the unrequested surgery has been considered
inequitable."' The injury and the benefit, occurring to the same interest,
must be balanced under the rule.
The incidental benefits rule was first mentioned in a wrongful concep-
tion context in Custodio v. Bauer. 1g In Custodio, the wife had been
sterilized to alleviate a bladder and kidney ailment that another preg-
nancy may have aggravated."' The court indicated that if the pregnancy
and delivery led to an improvement in her condition, the damage award
would be subject to an offset for the value of the improved condition.
11
Application of the rule outside this limited context was suggested in the
Custodio opinion, but not fully analyzed."
93
OF TORTS § 920, Note (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973). In Mohr, the plaintiff had agreed to an
operation on her right ear, but on the day of surgery and after she had been anesthetized,
the defendant determined that an operation on her left ear was necessary. 95 Minn. at
264-65, 104 N.W. at 13. The plaintiff sued, alleging that the operation, not having her
consent, amounted to an assault and battery. Id. at 265, 104 N.W. at 13. In discussing
the measure of damages, the court stated:
The amount of plaintiff's recovery, if she is entitled to recover at all, must
depend upon the character and extent of the injury inflicted upon her, in deter-
mining which the nature of the malady intended to be healed and the beneficial
nature of the operation should be taken into consideration, as well as the good
faith of the defendant.
Id. at 271, 104 N.W. at 16. Thus, damages for the assault upon plaintiff's ear, which
she contended had "greatly impaired her hearing," id. at 265, 104 N.W. at 13, could be
offset if the jury found that the condition of her ear had in fact been improved by the
operation or that the physician had acted in good faith. See also Maben v. Rankin, 55
Cal. 2d 139, 144, 358 P.2d 681, 684, 10 Cal. Rptr. 353, 356 (1961) (applying rule to action
for false imprisonment; damages for unlawful confinement in mental institution must be
offset by benefits conferred).
189. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF To's § 920, Comment a (1977).
190. See 251 Cal. App. 2d 303- 323, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 476 (1967).
191. Id. at 307-08, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 466.
192. Id. at 323, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
193. The court wrote: "If the failure of the sterilization operation and the ensuing
pregnancy benefitted the wife's emotional and nervous makeup, and any infirmities in her
kidney and bladder organs, the defendants should be able to offset it." Id. (emphasis
added). The same court later clarified this language in Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d
698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976). The Stills court explained that "the defendants may prove
any offsets for benefits conferred and amounts chargeable to a plaintiff under her duty to
mitigate damages." Id. at 709, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 659 (emphasis added). In neither case is
the language strong enough to indicate acceptance of the incidental benefits rule as a
general limitation on recovery. A benefit has to be proved under California law; it will
not be presumed in every case, as is the implication under Michigan law, see Troppi v.
Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 255, 187 N.W.2d 511, 518 (benefit "may be weighed against all
the elements of claimed damage"), leave to appeal denied, 385 Mich. 753 (1971), or under
Minnesota law following Sherlock. See 260 N.W.2d at 176 (failure to instruct jury to
deduct rearing costs for "value of the child's aid, comfort, and society" held reversible
error). In fact, it is arguable whether by cataloguing the items of benefit that may be
considered, the Minnesota court has foreclosed the possibility of a finding of no benefit.
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The Custodio court's application of the rule in the wrongful concep-
tion context prompted a Michigan court to adopt the rule generally in
cases involving the birth of an unplanned child. In Troppi v. Scarf, '
which involved negligence in the filling of a prescription for birth control
pills and not in the performance of a sterilization, the court found the
incidental benefits rule "essential to the rational disposition of this case
and the others that are sure to follow. The benefits rule allows flexibility
in the case-by-case adjudication of the enormously varied claims which
the widespread use of oral contraceptives portends."'' 5 Thus, the Troppi
court announced that parents who claim damages arising from the birth
of an unplanned child must offset recovery by the intrinsic benefits of
parenthood."'
The Troppi rule, while adopting the concept behind the Restatement
version of the incidental benefits rule, nevertheless departs significantly
from the Restatement version. As applied to the parents' claim for dam-
ages arising from the birth of an unplanned child, the Troppi rule ap-
pears to be inconsistent with the Restatement.
First, under the Troppi rule, negligent physicians, instead of being
required to pay compensation for the foreseeable consequences of their
negligence, are entitled to have the emotional value of the unplanned
child deducted from the award of damages. A literal application of the
Restatement rule appears to prohibit such a result because the tortfea-
sor is not permitted to "force a benefit" upon an injured party.'97 While
it may be asserted that the parents were not compelled to have the child
and therefore were not forced to take the benefits, the Troppi court, like
the Minnesota court in Sherlock, refused to consider the parents' deci-
sion to keep their child in the determination of damages.'18 Thus, appli-
194. 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511, leave to appeal denied, 385 Mich. 753 (1971).
As previously noted, see note 193 supra, the Custodio court indicated approval of a general
application of the incidental benefits rule. However, its discussion of the rule is not as
strongly phrased as the Troppi court's. Compare Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303,
323, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 476 (1967) with Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. at 254-57, 187
N.W.2d at 517-19.
195. 31 Mich. App. at 256, 187 N.W.2d at 518.
196. See id. at 254-57, 187 N.W.2d at 517-19. In rejecting the Troppi analysis, as well
as the parents' claim for damages for the costs of rearing an unplanned child, the court
in Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974), affl'd, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975),
remarked:
The preciousness of human life should not be held to vary with the circum-
stances surrounding birth. To make such a determination would, indeed, raise
the unfortunate prospect of ruling, as a matter of law, that under certain circum-
stances a child would not be worth the trouble and expense necessary to bring
him into the world.
327 A.2d at 761. The Coleman court's objections are equally applicable when the action
has been recognized as when the action is rejected.
197. See REffATEmET (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920, Comment f (1977).
198. See 31 Mich. App. at 257-60, 187 N.W.2d at 519-20.
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cation of the Restatement version of the incidental benefits rule to a
wrongful conception case arguably would have been erroneous. The
Troppi rule, applicable despite the obvious fact that it forces a benefit
upon the reluctant parents, therefore is inconsistent with the
Restatement.
Second, the Restatement rule is applicable only when the injury and
the benefit occur to the same interest."' The Troppi court professed
adherence to this requirement by stating that the injury and benefit that
occur in a wrongful conception case affect the parents' "family inter-
est." O However, the Troppi court may have taken too broad a view of
the Restatement rule's same-interest test. The expenses of rearing an
unplanned child affect the parents' pecuniary interests201 and should not
be balanced with the intangible, emotional benefits of parenthood.
2
The major problem with the incidental benefits rule is its inconsis-
tency with the ruling that the parents' decision not to seek an abortion
or to surrender their child for adoption should not be considered in
determining the amount of the physician's liability. By requiring the
parents to offset their recovery by the benefits they will receive from
their unplanned child, the courts adopting the incidental benefits rule
are necessarily permitting juries to weigh the parents' decision to keep
the child in arriving at the award of damages. As a practical matter, the
determination not to require abortion or adoption in mitigation of dam-
ages is undercut.
The Troppi court's version of the incidental benefits rule is addition-
ally objectionable because it is to be applied against the total award of
damages instead of just against the costs of rearing the unplanned child.
The medical expenses, loss of consortium, and cost of the sterilization
as well as the costs of rearing the child were all considered aspects of
the "family interest" by the Troppi court and hence subject to the offset
199. Compare Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 271, 104 N.W. 12, 16 (1905) (benefit of
operation on left ear when patient gave consent to operation on right ear may be consid-
ered in award of damages), overruled on other grounds, Genzel v. Halvorson, 248 Minn.
527, 534, 80 N.W.2d 854, 859 (1957) with Morris v. St. Paul City Ry., 105 Minn. 276, 281,
117 N.W. 500, 502 (1908) (damages for miscarriage not sufficiently related to negligent
act to be offset by probable benefit of not having to go through childbirth).
200. See 31 Mich. App. at 257, 187 N.W.2d at 519.
201. See Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 324, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 477 (1967)
(purpose of action is "to replenish the family exchequer so that the new arrival will not
deprive the other members of the family of what was planned as their just share of the
family income"); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 175 (Minn. 1977) (costs
of rearing unplanned child "are direct financial injury to the parents").
202. The comments to the Restatement explain that "[dlamages to a husband for loss
of consortium are not diminished by the fact that the husband is no longer under the
expense of supporting the wife." REsTATEM N r (SECOND) OF TorrS § 920, Comment b
(1977). The injury to the husband's marital interests cannot be balanced with the benefit
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for benefits. 203 Under the Troppi rule, the parents could well leave the
courtroom with no award or only a nominal award of damages.2 0 4
The Minnesota court unhesitatingly adopted the Troppi rule in the
Sherlock decision, only pausing long enough to observe that the Troppi
rule was derived from the Restatement version. 25 One limitation was
placed on the Troppi rule by the Sherlock court: only if parents claim
damages for the costs of rearing an unplanned child would the rule have
any bearing upon the award and then only upon the costs of rearing the
child.2m If the parents sue only for the medical expenses, loss of consor-
tium, and the wife's pain and suffering, the incidental benefits rule
would not be applicable under the Minnesota court's approach. Al-
though providing some form of compensation for the parents in every
case, this approach is still subject to the same infirmities as the Troppi
formulation20? Additional problems with the Sherlock approach to dam-
203. See 31 Mich. App. at 255, 187 N.W.2d at 518 ("Since pregnancy and its attendant
anxiety, incapacity, pain and suffering are inextricably related to child bearing, we do not
think it would be sound to attempt to separate those segments of damage from the
economic costs of an unplanned child in applying the 'same interest' rule.").
204. In Bushman v. Burns Clinic Medical Center, P.C., 83 Mich. App. 454, 268 N.W.2d
683 (1978), the court held that a claim for "wrongful pregnancy," that is, a claim only for
the medical expenses and other damages caused by the birth of an unplanned child
without including the costs of rearing, would not be subject to the incidental benefits rule.
The court explained: "To allow the defense to shield itself behind the love and affection
of the plaintiffs for their healthy and lovable fifth child is less than equitable if indeed
the plaintiffs' claims are in fact true." Id. at 463, 268 N.W.2d at 687-88. In Bushman, the
court found that the damages which were not "child centered" were "equitably severable"
from the damages for the rearing costs. See id. at 464, 268 N.W.2d at 688. Bushman
probably should be read with its facts in mind. The court placed emphasis upon the
mother's extreme difficulties during prior deliveries caused by her crippled physical condi-
tion. See id. Furthermore, the court labelled this action, in which the rearing costs had
not been claimed, as one for wrongful pregnancy and distinguished it on that basis from
Troppi. See id. at 459-60, 268 N.W.2d at 685-86.
205. See 260 N.W.2d at 174.
206. See 260 N.W.2d at 176 ("[Wle feel compelled to conclude that where the parents
. . . choose to include [rearing costs] in their claim, . . . we will permit them to recover
the reasonably foreseeable costs of rearing, subject to an offset for the value of the benefits
conferred to them by the child.").
207. An additional objection to permitting the physician to claim the benefits of parent-
hood in the determination of the award of damages lies in the collateral source rule. Under
the collateral source rule, an injured person's recovery is not diminished by benefits
received from a third person. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRrs § 920A(2) (1977). Thus,
insurance proceeds that compensate the injured party for medical expenses or loss of
wages are usually not considered in determining the scope of the tortfeasor's liability. See
Maxwell, The Collateral Source Rule in the American Law of Damages, 46 MINN. L. REv.
669, 672-79 (1962). Similarly, employment benefits cannot be considered. See id. at 679-
86. Because the benefit received by the injured person is from a third person, the defen-
dant is not permitted to claim the benefit.
The benefit that the physician is claiming the parents receive in a wrongful conception
action, although not a monetary benefit as is usually the case in applying the collateral
source rule, is the benefit to be derived from raising their child. Such a benefit does not
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ages lie in its method of computing recovery, the subject of the following
section. By adopting the incidental benefits rule, the Sherlock court was
following the general trend of cases.2 "8 But by failing to recognize the
faults in the application of the rule to the action for wrongful concep-
tion, the Minnesota court may have achieved an inequitable result.
C. Computation of Damages Under the Sherlock Formula
The practical application of the incidental benefits rule in an action
for wrongful conception in Minnesota was outlined in the Sherlock opin-
ion. Under the Sherlock computation, damages always will consist of
two separate items: the damages incident to the pregnancy, such as the
medical expenses and pain and suffering caused by the pregnancy,
which are not subject to reduction, 09 and the damages incident to rais-
ing the unplanned child, which will be diminished by the incidental
benefits rule. 10
Computation of the damages to be awarded for the costs of rearing
the unplanned child necessitates a two-part determination. First to be
determined are "the reasonably foreseeable expenses that will be in-
curred by the parents to maintain, support, and educate their child." ''
Unless the child is born with "congenital deformities, 2 1 2 these expenses
would be projected only through the child's minority.213 This limitation
proceed directly from the physician, but rather comes from the unplanned child itself.
Viewing the child as a third person giving the parents the benefit of its love and affection,
the collateral source rule would prohibit the physician from having these benefits weighed
in the determination of the parents' damages.
208. See, e.g., Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 709, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652, 658-59
(1976); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 254-57, 187 N.W.2d 511, 517, leave to appeal
denied, 385 Mich. 753 (1971).
209.. 260 N.W.2d at 175; see Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 761-62 (Del. Super. Ct.
1974) (only damages incident to pregnancy allowable; no damages awarded for costs of
rearing), aff'd, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975); Bushman v. Bums Clinic Medical Center, P.C., 83
Mich. App. 453, 461, 268 N.W.2d 683, 686-87 (1978) (damages incident to pregnancy
recoverable; no offset for benefits required); 70 W. VA. L. REv. 242, 245 (1968) (medical
expenses that are direct result of negligence should always be recoverable).
210. See 260 N.W.2d at 175-76. Because of the method chosen by the Sherlock court to
compute damages, the court required the use of a special verdict form in all actions for
wrongful conception. See id. at 176.
211. Id. at 176.
212. See 260 N.W.2d at 176 & nl. Some birth control advocates have argued that
preventing the birth of deformed children is one reason for removing the obstacles that
impede access to contraceptives and sterilization. See, e.g., G. W111&iMs, Sterilization, in
THE SANCTITY OF LoFE AND THE CRiMiNAL LAw 74, 80-96 (1957).
213. 260 N.W.2d at 176. The court also wrote that "[should the child's life expectancy
for some reason be less than that of his parents, the value of the benefits conferred would
necessarily be computed for the expected duration of his life." Id. at 176 n.12. It may be
that in a situation where the child's life expectancy is less than its parents, the parents
would be entitled to greater damages. See Howard v. Lecher, 53 A.D.2d 420, 434-37, 386
N.Y.S.2d 460, 469-71 (1976) (Margett, J., dissenting) (parents' mental suffering due to
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on the parent's recovery is not unreasonable. A parent's duty to support
its child is a legal obligation imposed upon the parent only during the
child's minority."' To limit the parents' recovery to the time period in
which they have a legal duty to support the child is justifiable .
15
The second determinaion to be made pertains to the benefits of par-
enthood. To be valued in this determination are "the child's aid, com-
fort, and society which will benefit the parents for the duration of their
lives."2"6 The Sherlock court admitted that its sole reason for valuing the
benefits over the lifetime of the parents was the lack of a pecuniary
benefit from the child during minority. " ' The explanation does not indi-
cate why the court chose to include in this determination emotional as
well as pecuniary benefits. Offsetting the financial losses with the finan-
cial and emotional benefits perhaps would result in the absence of any
recovery for the parents. This offset of the losses and benefits would be
less objectionable if the parents were seeking damages for the inconven-
ience raising a child brings to their lives.l 8 In an action for wrongful
conception, however, the parents are claiming damages for the financial
losses caused by raising an unplanned child." 9 The court's formula,
solely in regard to the items to be compared, is weighted against the
parents.
child born with Tay-Sachs disease, terminal within first five years of life, should be
compensable when doctor failed to inform parents of risk), aff'd, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366
N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977).
214. See Mund v. Mund, 252 Minn. 442, 445, 90 N.W.2d 309, 312 (1958) (parents have
legal duty to care for offspring until child is old enough to care for itself); McAllen v.
McAllen, 97 Minn. 76, 81-82, 106 N.W. 100, 102 (1906) (same).
215. Compare McCarthy v. McCarthy, 301 Minn. 270, 274, 222 N.W.2d 331, 334 (1974)
(parents' duty to support handicapped child may extend beyond age of majority) with
LaBelle v. LaBelle, 302 Minn. 98, 115, 223 N.W.2d 400, 410 (1974) (parents' duty to
educate child ceases when child attains its majority).
216. 260 N.W.2d at 176. This determination is similar to the one followed in wrongful
death cases involving a deceased minor. Compare Palmer v. Haluplzok, 294 F. Supp. 489,
492 (D. Minn. 1969) (applying Minnesota law) with Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260
N.W.2d at 176.
217. 260 N.W.2d at 176 n.12.
218. A New Jersey court has approved the award of damages for all losses resulting from
negligent sterilization, "including the costs, emotional upset and the physical inconven-
ience of rearing a child." Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 77, 344 A.2d 336, 340
(Law Div. 1975). See also Green v. Sudakin, 81 Mich. App. 545, 548-49, 265 N.W.2d 411,
412-13 (1978) (per curiam) (damages for mental pain and suffering, usually not permitted
in actions for breach of contract, available in sterilization case due to "intensely personal"
nature of contract). In such a situation, reducing damages by the benefits received may
be more equitable.
219. The parents' complaint for damages in the Sherlock case did not seek compensa-
tion for mental suffering and inconvenience caused by rearing an unplanned child. See
260 N.W.2d at 171. The expense of raising the child, outside the medical expenses, loss of
consortium, and mother's pain and suffering resulting from the pregnancy, was the contro-
versial item of damages. See id. at 175.
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The balance is tilted further against the parents when the periods over
which damages will be measured are considered. The costs of rearing the
child must be ascertained solely with regard to the period of time in
which the parents have a legal duty to support the child." The benefits,
on the other hand, are to be determined based upon the life expectancy
of the parents.2' No rational basis exists to justify this distinction. Par-
ents may have a legal right to the services of minor children,2 22 but any
benefits received from the child after it has attained majority can only
be regarded as gifts. 22 The time frame for determining the benefits
should be the same as the time frame used in determining the costs of
rearing the child.
Even if the Sherlock court's adoption of the incidental benefits rule
in an action for wrongful conception is accepted, its approach to the
measure of damages cannot be. If a balancing test is to be utilized, then
all the detriments of having a child should be weighed against all the
benefits. Should a less speculative approach be desired, the balance
should be struck between purely pecuniary losses and gains. The
Sherlock approach to the measure of damages can only reward the negli-
gent physician and therefore is inconsistent with one of the stated pur-
poses the action was to serve: deterring physicians from negligently
performing sterilizations . 24 A reformulation of the measure of damages
appears to be necessary for the action for wrongful conception to serve
this purpose meaningfully.
D. Some Suggested Approaches to Damages
The purpose of adopting the incidental benefits rule in actions for
wrongful conception is to avoid an award of windfall damages to the
parents and to prevent overburdening physicians with unlimited liabil-
ity. Offsetting the costs of rearing a child to maturity against the
220. 260 N.W.2d at 176.
221. Id.
222. See, e.g., In re Parks, 267 Minn. 468, 474, 127 N.W.2d 548, 553 (1964) (parents had
right to child's "services" at common law); Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 401, 37
N.W.2d 543, 544-45 (1949) (child has duty "to render obedience and services to the par-
ent").
223. See Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 360-61, 113 N.W.2d 355, 363 (1961) (adult
child is under no duty at common law to support its parents; duty must be based on
contract or statute). But see Sellnow v. Fahey, 305 Minn. 375, 381-82, 233 N.W.2d 563,
568 (1975) (expectation of benefit, not legal right to benefit, determines whether services
of deceased child are recoverable item of damages in action for wrongful death).
224. See 260 N.W.2d at 175.
225. Courts prefer to regard the rule as affording flexibility in the determination of
damages. See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 255-57, 187 N.W.2d 511, 518-19,
leave to appeal denied, 385 Mich. 753 (1971). However, because the incidental benefits
rule is a response to the objection that the birth of a child is not an injury to the parents,
see Comment, supra note 96, at 1197-1200, limiting damages appears to be a necessary
consequence of adopting the rule.
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benefits of parenthood is seen as an equitable method by which to
achieve this purpose. This method works against parents of unplanned
children-the victims of the physician's negligence. A more equitable
approach should be adopted.
In an effort to arrive at such an equitable solution to the issue of
damages, some commentators have suggested that damages could be
based upon the parents' reasons for seeking a sterilization.212 This ap-
proach would award damages to the parents whose reasons were eco-
nomic and deny damages to the parents whose reasons were therapeu-
tic. 12 Because damages are based upon the forseeability of injury, this
approach attempts to inject the physicians' awareness of the purpose for
which they were engaged into the computation of damages.Y' This ap-
proach, however, appears to adopt a contractual liability for the physi-
cian that is inconsistent with the tort aspects of the action. 229 Further-
more, when the parents' reasons are unknown or multiple, this approach
would be difficult to apply.
23
0
Another suggested approach considers the reasons for the sterilization
and the socio-economic status of the parents in arriving at damages. 3'
While this suggestion comes closest to an attempt to measure the true
impact of an unplanned birth upon a particular set of parents, it falls
short because it relies heavily upon a single objective criteria. The abil-
ity of parents to bear the financial burden of raising an unplanned child
may be a factor in determining damages but it should not be a conclu-
sive factor in denying recovery.
The better approach would be to determine the actual impact of the
unplanned birth upon the particular parents who have commenced an
action for wrongful conception. An impact-measurement approach
would require the jury to consider all the facts and circumstances sur-
226. See Note, Redressing a Blessing: The Question of Damages for Negligently Per-
formed Sterilization Operations, 33 U. Prrr. L. Rzv. 886, 895-99 (1972); 70 W. VA. L. RE'.
242, 245-46 (1968); Note, supra note 115, at 992-94.
227. See, e.g., 70 W. VA. L. REv. 242, 245-46 (1968).
228. See id. at 245-46 (costs of rearing could be awarded if physician aware that parents'
reason for operation was to limit family size).
229. While foreseeability of injury may be a consideration in determining whether cer-
tain conduct was negligent, proximate cause, not foreseeability, is the pivotal issue in
determining damages for negligence. See Dellwo v. Pearson, 259 Minn. 452, 453-56, 107
N.W.2d 859, 860-62 (1961) (jury instruction making foreseeability element of proximate
cause reversible error). Because the action for wrongful conception is essentially a negli-
gence action, see notes 96-131 supra and accompanying text, liability should be deter-
mined with regard to the losses proximately caused by the negligence and not the losses
contemplated by the parties as a natural consequence of the operation. Thus, the reasons
for the sterilization should not determine damages.
230. See Note, supra note 226, at 896-97 (author suggests judicial resolution in these
situations).
231. See id. at 895-99.
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rounding the unplanned birth: the family size and income, the parents'
ages and social status, the physical condition of the child, and the emo-
tional effects of the unplanned birth upon the parents.3 The probable
costs of rearing the child to maturity, as well as the probable benefits
to be derived from the child, would become factors under this approach
rather than the sine qua non of recovery. The incidental benefits rule
attempts to achieve an equitable result by limiting parents to the actual
losses sustained, but it places too great an emphasis upon emotional
values that are difficult to measure. Furthermore, the incidental bene-
fits rule requires that the parents prove the absence of benefits before
recovery, as a practical matter, can be allowed. An impact-
measurement approach would not require the parents to face the jury
arguing that they have sustained an injury by becoming parents when
they have determined to remain parents. The impact-measurement
approach would further the purpose of deterring physicians from negli-
gent conduct without offering a reward in the guise of parental benefits.
Measuring the true impact of the unplanned birth upon the parents
contains an inherent limitation on recovery because the parents would
not be awarded damages for raising the child but for the real injury that
they have sustained. As in a Sherlock computation of damages,2n strict
judicial scrutiny of awards would also be available to limit recovery.
Unencumbered by the overly broad requests for the costs of rearing
an unplanned child and by the inequities of the incidental benefits rule,
an impact-measurement standard would provide a method to determine
the true injury to the parents of unplanned children. Under this ap-
proach, the final award of damages would, in the Sherlock court's words,
be "a mortal attempt to do justice in an imperfect world, ' ' 23 4 without the
serious problems raised by the incidental benefits rule.
V. BEYOND Sherlock-THE INTERESTS OF THE
UNPLANNED CHILD
The decision in Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic represents a judicial
acknowledgment of changing public attitudes toward child rearing. By
permitting parents to sue physicians who have negligently caused the
birth of an unplanned child, the Minnesota court has afforded the par-
ents a remedy for interference with their right to limit the size of their
families. With the recognition of the action for wrongful conception, the
232. The Troppi court believed its approach would accomplish such a result. See 31
Mich. App. at 255-57, 187 N.W.2d at 518-19. The court's emphasis upon the incidental
benefits rule, however, clouds its analysis.
233. See 260 N.W.2d at 176.
234. Id. The court reversed and remanded the case for retrial on the issue of damages
because the jury had not been instructed on the incidental benefits rule and had not been
required to return a special verdict. Id. The case was eventually settled for $17,000. 21
ATLA L. REP. 190 (1978).
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Minnesota court has not forsaken the interests of the unplanned child.
Other courts have been concerned with the effect the parents' lawsuit
may have on the unplanned child when the child discovers that it was
unplanned, although one court believed that the effect would not be any
greater for a child whose birth results in an action for wrongful concep-
tion than for any other unplanned child. 215 The Minnesota court did not
reflect upon the emotional effects the action could have on the un-
planned child. Instead, the court reminded attorneys of their duty to
consider the interests of all persons affected by the filing of a lawsuit
3
235. Concern for the feelings of the unplanned child prompted the Wisconsin Supreme
Court to write:
Since the child involved might some day read this decision as to who is to pay
for his support and upbringing, we add that we do not understand this com-
plaint as implying any present rejection or future strain upon the parent-child
relationship. Rather we see it as an endeavor on the part of clients and counsel
to determine the outer limits of physician liability for failure to diagnose the fact
of pregnancy.
Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 520, 219 N.W.2d 242, 245-46 (1974);
accord, Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8, 14 (Del. 1975) (citing and quoting Rieck; un-
planned child should not consider lawsuit to be founded upon parents' rejection), aff'g 327
A.2d 757 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974). On the other hand, the California court, in Custodio v.
Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967), rejected the argument that an
unplanned child who learned of its parents' suit should be protected from the stigma of
"emotional bastardy" on the ground that such a child would suffer no greater an injury
than other children whose births were unplanned. Id. at 324, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477. The
emotional injury sustained by an unplanned child should not be discounted, however. As
one prominent psychiatrist has observed:
Nothing is more tragic, more fateful in its ultimate consequences, than the
realization by a child that he was unwanted. Where one child reacts to this in
later life with an acute mental illness, dozens of children ... react to it in more
subtle ways by developing self-protective barriers against the inner perception
of the feeling of being unwanted. This may show itself in a determined campaign
or in a provocative program of attracting attention by offensive behavior and
even criminal acts. Still more seriously it may show itself as a constant fear of
other people, or as a bitter prejudice against individuals or groups through deep-
seated, easily evoked hatred for them.
Menninger, Psychiatric Aspects of Contraception, in THERAPEUTIC ABORTION 247, 250 (H.
Rosen ed. 1954). See generally Wolf, supra note 32, at 109-18.
One study of Swedish children born after their mothers' applications for abortions were
rejected concluded: "the very fact that a woman applies for legal abortion means that the
prospective child runs a risk of having to surmount greater social and mental handicaps
than its peers, even when the grounds for the application are so slight that it is refused."
Forssman & Thuwe, One Hundred and Twenty Children Born After Application for Ther-
apeutic Abortion Refused, in ABORTION AND THE UNWANTED CHILD 123, 143 (C. Reiterman
ed. 1971). In the authors' opinion, legislation permitting therapeutic termination of preg-
nancy should also consider the social risks to which the unexpected child will be exposed.
Id. Perhaps the action for wrongful conception should consider these same social risks in
devising the measure of damages.
236. See 260 N.W.2d at 177 & n.16 (citing A.B.A. CODE OF PROFEssIONAL REsPONSILIrY
EC 7-10 which requires an attorney "to treat with consideration all persons involved in
the legal process and to avoid the infliction of needless harm").
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Attorneys and parents were instructed to "give serious reflection to the
silent interests of the child and, in particular, the parent-child relation-
ships that must be sustained long after legal controversies have been
laid to rest.''1 3 The steps to be taken to satisfy the court's instructions
were left unstated, perhaps with the understanding that such a decision
should be left to the parents with the advice of their legal counsel.
Nevertheless, the court's message was clear: the unplanned child's in-
terests should be considered before the decision to initiate an action for
wrongful conception is made.
The evolution of the action for wrongful conception illustrates what
Dean Prosser has observed-the tendency of the courts to grant increas-
ing protection to family interests.2  Unsatisfactory as the Sherlock reso-
lution of the damages controversy is, the decision is important as a
method of enforcing perhaps the most fundamental of all family inter-
ests-the right to control procreation.
237. Id. at 177.
238. W. PROSSER, supra note 110, § 124, at 887-88 (4th ed. 1971) (statutory abolition of
alienation of affections action in many states has reversed trend toward increased protec-
tion to family interests).
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